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| 1 |
ID:
059010
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| 2 |
ID:
071449
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| 3 |
ID:
099380
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| 4 |
ID:
097171
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| 5 |
ID:
101890
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of the financial crisis, the United States is no longer the leader of the global economy, and no other nation has the political and economic leverage to replace it. Rather than a forum for compromise, the G-20 is likely to be an arena of conflict.
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| 6 |
ID:
072035
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| 7 |
ID:
083762
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| 8 |
ID:
105090
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Halfway through 2011, we've already seen an extraordinary year of volatility: turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, the eurozone's ongoing fiscal crises, Japan's triple disaster, the killing of Osama bin Laden. Yet these dramatic events have obscured a slow-moving, underlying shift of much greater long-term importance: global rebalancing. In its simplest form, rebalancing means this: a reset of the global economy shifting the balance of accounts between the world's established and emerging powers or between its biggest consumers and biggest savers. That alone, of course, is a transition of landmark historic significance. Yet it is far from the only consequence, for rebalancing is not just an economic story, but one that will result in a seismic shift in the international balance of power, in every region of the world.
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| 9 |
ID:
073050
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Latin American voters will soon cast ballots in national elections in several countries. Some argue that the region is undergoing a uniform political shift to the left, that mistrust of neo-liberal economics and US foreign policy has united these states in a populist wave of reaction against both, and that this trend will bind these states to countries outside the region, undermining US interests. This generalisation does not withstand country-specific scrutiny. Analysis of the unique political circumstances in each of these states reveals that the populist, anti-American trend is hardly uniform, and that the political and economic ties that bind Latin America and the United States are not so easily undone.
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| 10 |
ID:
082380
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the Soviet collapse, the dynamism and market power of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe established the dominance of a liberal economic mode fuelled by private wealth, private investment and private enterprise. Yet, over the past several years, public wealth, public investment, and public enterprise have made a remarkable comeback. An era of state capitalism has dawned, the natural by-product of a global economy which will increasingly depend for most of its growth on China, the Persian Gulf states, and other emerging market countries, many of which are predisposed toward statist models of economic development. This trend is generating plenty of anxiety, particularly among American and European policymakers, who fear that the growth of national oil companies, state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds threatens their countries' economic well-being and national security
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| 11 |
ID:
057668
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| 12 |
ID:
078043
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| 13 |
ID:
077573
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Little is known about the siloviki, commonly but misleadingly described as a group of current and former intelligence officers from Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg. Yet, its members, interests, relationships, and influence are helping shape Russia as its 2008 presidential elections approach
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| 14 |
ID:
077357
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| 15 |
ID:
089224
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Across the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the developed world, the recent wave of state interventionism is meant to lessen the pain of the current global recession and restore ailing economies to health. For the most part, the governments of developed countries do not intend to manage these economies indefinitely. However, an opposing intention lies behind similar interventions in the developing world: there the state's heavy hand in the economy is signaling a strategic rejection of free-market doctrine.
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| 16 |
ID:
125095
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AS IF a global financial-market meltdown, the deepest U.S. recession in seventy years, an existential crisis in the euro zone and upheaval in the Middle East hadn't already created enough trouble for one decade, now the unrest and anxiety have extended to some of the world's most attractive emerging markets. Just in the past few months, we've seen a rough ride for India's currency, furious nationwide protests in Turkey and Brazil, antigovernment demonstrations in Russia, strikes and violence in South Africa, and an ominous economic slowdown in all these countries.
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| 17 |
ID:
182260
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| Summary/Abstract |
After rioters stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, some of
the United States’ most powerful institutions sprang into action to punish the leaders ofthe failed insurrection. But they
weren’t the ones you might expect. Facebook and Twitter suspended
the accounts ofPresident Donald Trump for posts praising the rioters. Amazon, Apple, and Google e,ectively banished Parler, an alternative to Twitter that Trump’s supporters had used to encourage and
coordinate the attack, by blocking its access to Web-hosting services
and app stores. Major -nancial service apps, such as PayPal and
Stripe, stopped processing payments for the Trump campaign and
for accounts that had funded travel expenses to Washington, D.C.,
for Trump’s supporters.
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| 18 |
ID:
068252
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