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| 1 |
ID:
107147
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overarching Western objective in Afghanistan should be to prevent that country from becoming not just a haven for transnational terrorists, but a terrorist ally as well. That was the situation prior to 9/11 and it would be so again if the Taliban returned to power with al-Qaeda backing. NATO can prevent this indefinitely as long as it is willing to commit significant military and economic resources to a counter-insurgency effort. It cannot eliminate the threat, however, as long as the Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in and support from Pakistan. Alternatively, this objective could be achieved if the Taliban could be persuaded to cut its ties to al-Qaeda and end its insurgency in exchange for some role in Afghan governance short of total control.
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| 2 |
ID:
057728
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004.
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| Description |
xxiv, 129p.
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| Standard Number |
0833036408
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048925 | 958.1047/OLI 048925 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
069334
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2003.
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| Description |
xxxv, 244p.
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| Standard Number |
083303460X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046902 | 327.73009045/DOB 046902 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
109889
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| 5 |
ID:
153357
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From its peak in late 2014, the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) has steadily lost territory and population. As an actual – if unrecognised – state, it is on the verge of extinction. Mosul, its last major stronghold in Iraq, is nearly cleared. Raqqa, its capital in Syria, is surrounded and awaiting an assault. The trend lines are stark. By early 2017, according to our estimates, ISIS controlled approximately 45,377 square kilometres and roughly 2.5 million people in Syria and Iraq. Compared to autumn 2014, these numbers represented a 56% decline in Syria and an 83% decline in Iraq in terms of the Islamic State’s control of people. In Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan and Nigeria, ISIS controlled a combined 7,323km2 and 497,420 people by early 2017, representing a 75% drop in its control of people in Nigeria, nearly 100% in Libya and 87% in Afghanistan. In Egypt, ISIS operates in only a tiny stretch of the Sinai.1 Polling data also indicates declining support across the Muslim world for ISIS and its ideology.
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| 6 |
ID:
084661
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| 7 |
ID:
082382
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite continuing difficulties, European institutions for the management of civil-military operations have developed to the stage where more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked upon with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy which must underlie it. Outside of Europe, the most efficient way for European governments to contribute to international peace operations will be to assign national contingents directly to UN peacekeeping missions. It is, thus, time for European governments, militaries and populations to get over the trauma of Srebrenica and related UN failures in the Balkans in the early 1990s, take on board the subsequent improvement in the UN's performance, and begin once again to do their share in manning, as they are already doing in paying for, these efforts
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| 8 |
ID:
059026
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By losing the trust of the Iraqi people, the Bush administration has already lost the war. Moderate Iraqis can still win it, but only if they wean themselves from Washington and get support from elsewhere. To help them, the United States should reduce and ultimately eliminate its military presence, train Iraqis to beat the insurgency on their own, and rally Iran and European allies to the cause.
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| 9 |
ID:
093574
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| 10 |
ID:
066558
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| 11 |
ID:
090187
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2009.
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L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003 with a broad mandate and plenary powers. As administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), he was charged with governing Iraq and promoting the development of a functioning democracy that, it was hoped, would serve as a model for the entire Middle East. Bremer could dispose of all Iraqi state assets and direct all Iraqi government officials. He possessed full executive, legislative and judicial authority. His instructions from Washington were quite general, and for the most part oral. Over the next several months he received plentiful advice but little further direction.
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| 12 |
ID:
116656
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Societies emerging from conflict face many obstacles to achieving enduring peace, economic development and political reform. These include sectarian divides, historical animosities, poverty, weak institutions and malign neighbours. Some analysts have found these local factors so various as to argue that there can be no generic approaches to post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction (known more colloquially as nation-building). Others have argued that these obstacles are so daunting as to make the whole nation-building project too difficult and expensive to even attempt. Yet of 20 major peacekeeping or peace-enforcement interventions undertaken since the end of the Cold War, 16 have produced greater peace, 18 saw increases in democratisation (according to Freedom House), 17 saw improvements in government effectiveness (according to the World Bank), 18 experienced economic growth - indeed, generally faster growth than other countries in their region - and 18 saw improvements in their human development, as measured by the UN.
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| 13 |
ID:
072902
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Preparation for nation-building requires that responsible political leaders consult both with regional and functional experts, those who know why the society in question descended into conflict and those who know from experience elsewhere how to put such societies back together. Goals must be established which transcend the most immediate and normally negative purposes of the intervention, e.g. halting conflict, stopping genocide or turning back aggression. These positive goals must be commensurate with the scale of military manpower and economic assistance likely to be committed. The larger the social transformation envisaged, the greater the resistance likely to be encountered. The most common cause for the failure of nation-building endeavours is a mismatch between objectives and commitments
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| 14 |
ID:
059133
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| Publication |
2004.
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| Description |
p81-102
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| 15 |
ID:
078501
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| Publication |
2007.
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The current debate over the United States' failures in Iraq needs to go beyond bumper-sticker conclusions -- no more preemption, no more democracy promotion, no more nation building -- and acrimonious finger-pointing. Only by carefully considering where U.S. leaders, institutions, and policies have been at fault can valuable lessons be learned and future debacles avoided.
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