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ID:
151894
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| Summary/Abstract |
Seventy years into the nuclear age, something revolutionary is about to occur. It is likely that, within the next year or two, a majority of the world’s countries will declare in a legally binding document that they no longer accept nuclear deterrence as a valid concept in international relations.
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| 2 |
ID:
187496
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| Summary/Abstract |
Arms control has increasingly become threatened by compliance issues. Viewed individually, these issues might be expected and should not be cause for alarm. However, the list of agreements with unresolved issues has grown too long to ignore. The US State Department’s 2021 arms-control-compliance report calls attention to this problem. Recent casualties include the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Although the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has been renewed, even the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is under stress because of the view, shared by many states, that there has been a failure to implement its key nuclear-disarmament obligation. Many are advocating a move to less formal arms-control arrangements that are politically but not legally binding. However, these bring their own set of compliance problems—in particular, lack of effective verification regimes and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The current approach to compliance issues is failing. These issues need more urgent, high-level attention if the world is to avoid this threat to international peace and security.
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| 3 |
ID:
152064
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is closely connected to US attitudes toward the treaty, which in turn depend upon US perceptions of how the treaty affects US security. There have been wild swings in these perceptions since the treaty was signed in 1996. Impressive progress has been made in the ability to verify the CTBT in recent years, both in the International Monitoring System and in the possible use of on-site inspections. Questions remain in the minds of opponents regarding the treaty's possible effect on the US nuclear stockpile, as well as the treaty's overall relationship to nonproliferation. The new Trump administration will need to decide how to proceed on this crucial piece of unfinished business. In addition to finally ratifying the treaty, other options are possible.
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| 4 |
ID:
169710
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| Summary/Abstract |
Arms control is going through a very difficult period. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is gone, the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is basically dead, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran is in tatters, the future of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is in doubt, it appears possible the United States will withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, and there are concerns over whether damage will be done to the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at its review conference next year.
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| 5 |
ID:
079766
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| 6 |
ID:
057953
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| 7 |
ID:
163597
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| Summary/Abstract |
What is needed is a sustained and concerted effort to identify the conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons, and the resolve to create them over the long haul.
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| 8 |
ID:
170579
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| Summary/Abstract |
he immediate challenge is to consolidate progress already made and grab the low-hanging fruit
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| 9 |
ID:
176527
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| Summary/Abstract |
A US nuclear-test explosion would violate the United States’ interpretation of the CTBT and open the door to resumed testing by other countries, particularly North Korea.
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| 10 |
ID:
066573
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