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| 1 |
ID:
058909
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| Publication |
Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2004.
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| Description |
viii, 320p.
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| Standard Number |
0878403477
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049175 | 363.320973/CRO 049175 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
074927
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The means and ends of mass mobilization are changing, bypassing the traditional state-centered approach that was the hallmark of the French Revolution and leaving advanced Western democracies merely to react to the results. Today's dynamic social, economic, and political transitions are as important to war as were the changes at the end of the 18th century that Clausewitz observed. Most important is the 21st century's levée en masse, a mass networked mobilization that emerges from cyber-space with a direct impact on physical reality. Individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are altering the nature of human social interaction, thus also affecting the shape and outcome of domestic and international conflict.
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| 3 |
ID:
082091
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2008.
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| Description |
86p.
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| Series |
Adelphi paper; 394
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| Standard Number |
9780415450621
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053133 | 303.625/CRO 053133 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
096752
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have yielded important progress against Al-Qaeda abroad, even with heightened anxiety about the threat of attacks at home. There was certainly no 'clash of civilizations'; violent Salafism engendered a muscular backlash in Muslim-majority countries, which threatened Al-Qaeda's ability to recruit and even survive. At the same time, the policies of major states became more effective and better aligned. A nascent counterterrorism coalition emerged with unprecedented sharing of intelligence, operations and deradicalization techniques (especially bilaterally). In the face of these developments, a defensive Al-Qaeda scrambled to exploit vulnerabilities so as to regain a mental edge. The result was two tactical setbacks for the allies: first, Al-Qaeda and its associates redoubled their efforts to kill civilians on western soil, focusing particularly on radicalized home grown amateurs; and second, they leaned more heavily on reinvigorated affiliates, some of whom tried to project force beyond their local operating areas for the first time. As a result, terrorist operations in the US and UK were more frequent, unpredictable and unsophisticated, but nonetheless potentially lethal. As the period drew to a close, the crucial question was whether the two western allies could maintain their nerve, luck, skill and sufficient equilibrium to both fend off a domestic attack and plan for an effective strategic response in the event that one occurred.
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| 5 |
ID:
073824
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al-Qaida will end. The fear that a small terrorist organization with a loose network has transformed itself into a protracted global ideological struggle without an end in sight is misguided. There are centuries of experience with modern terrorist movements, many bearing important parallels with al-Qaida; yet the lessons arising from the demise of these groups are little studied. Unfortunately, terrorist organizations in their final stages are often at their most dangerous. The outcomes can range from implosion of a group and its cause to transition to astonishing acts of violence and interstate war. Comparing al-Qaida's differences and similarities with those of earlier terrorist organizations, and applying relevant lessons to this case, can provide insights into al-Qaida's likely demise. It can also inform thinking about how to manage and hasten al-Qaida's end.
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| 6 |
ID:
093253
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| Publication |
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.
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| Description |
xvi, 311p.
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| Standard Number |
9780691139487
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054677 | 363.325/CRO 054677 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
137581
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| Summary/Abstract |
After 9/11, many within the U.S. national security establishment worried that, following decades of preparation for confronting conventional enemies, Washington was unready for the challenge posed by an unconventional adversary such as al Qaeda. So over the next decade, the United States built an elaborate bureaucratic structure to fight the jihadist organization, adapting its military and its intelligence and law enforcement agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
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| 8 |
ID:
021618
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2002.
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| Description |
119-139
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| 9 |
ID:
058005
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| 10 |
ID:
117983
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Having crushed the al-Qaeda leadership, the United States and its NATO allies should exit Afghanistan without leaving behind the kind of instability that prompted their intervention in the first place. No other sub-region of the world contains such a dangerous intersection of radical ideologies, clashing interests, and regional nuclear arsenals. Further proliferation, lucrative drug corridors, and exploitable mineral wealth will make future Afghan conflicts more dangerous than ever. Yet under our current approach, the United States is failing to protect its interests as it withdraws from Afghan territory and the neighbors prepare to pounce. Although it defies current practice, the United States urgently needs not short-term but long-term thinking. Washington must craft a lasting political strategy for managing Afghanistan and the region from afar.
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| 11 |
ID:
111788
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| 12 |
ID:
181190
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What should the future of US counter-terrorism policy be? This article reviews American strategic successes and mistakes of the past 20 years, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drifting objectives, public intolerance of risk and a misguided counter-insurgency approach to counter-terrorism all yielded an undifferentiated global campaign of attrition that the United States could never win. As the years passed, tactics eclipsed strategic thinking altogether. Meanwhile, the impact of digital technology, a resurgent right-wing threat and rising major powers such as Russia and China altered the global context and required new thinking. The only way the United States can respond effectively, especially after the calamitous and credibility-sapping withdrawal from Afghanistan, is to build stronger links with capable allies and partners, and to reframe its approach. The future of US counter-terrorism demands moving beyond a symmetrical US global counter-insurgency approach and adopting a selective, asymmetrical strategy of strongpoint defence.
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| 13 |
ID:
131337
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| Publication |
2014.
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The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the 'war on terrorism.' What does 'success' in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.
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| 14 |
ID:
120801
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drones are not helping to defeat al Qaeda and may be creating sworn enemies out of a sea of local insurgents. Embracing them as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism would be a mistake.
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