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| 1 |
ID:
120538
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although there is clear dissatisfaction in China with the nature of the current global order, it is hard to find a clear and coherent Chinese vision of what an alternative world might look like. This is partly a result of conflicting understandings within the country of the benefits and drawbacks of taking a more proactive global role and perhaps undertaking more leadership functions. But it is also a consequence of how elites frame Chinese interests and demands in different ways for different audiences.
Furthermore, the existing order has in fact served China quite well in its transition towards becoming a global power. So while at times China appears to be the main driver for reform and change, at other times (or to other people) the emphasis is on China as a responsible stakeholder in the existing system.
How others receive and interpret these conflicting signals is likely to be influenced by the way China exercises, rather than talks about, its growing power - perhaps most notably in terms of its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas and its role as a regional power.
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| 2 |
ID:
079407
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| Publication |
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
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| Description |
ix, 246p.
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| Standard Number |
9781403986474
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052763 | 337.51/BRE 052763 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
172117
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| Summary/Abstract |
The very simple and straightforward aim of this special issue is to outline and analyse how debates over international politics and China’s global role have evolved in China in recent years. In particular, we want to open up debates that can be found in the Chinese language literature to an audience that might not normally be able to access or understand them. To be sure, there is now a relatively large cohort of Chinese academics publishing in English in high quality outlets and participating in international conferences. Their scholarship and insights have done much to increase knowledge and understanding of Chinese thinking. Even so, we think the time is right for a collection that looks in depth at Chinese debates and discourses for five main reasons.
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| 4 |
ID:
164944
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President Xi Jinping dominated the Chinese stage during 2018, continuing to consolidate his power as the CCP sought to reassert its primacy. China flexed its muscles as a great power in a pitch for global leadership. Xi pushed constantly to portray China as the promoter of an open global economy, even as his own continued to slow incrementally amid the widening trade war with the US.
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| 5 |
ID:
172457
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a year of considerable pomp and circumstance at home, China’s leaders continued to focus on how to deal with slowing economic growth, and the need for greater unity and support for the party (and Xi’s) priorities and goals. Despite efforts to persuade others of the global benefits of China’s rise, a number of key international actors seemed to increasingly think otherwise.
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| 6 |
ID:
108411
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The global financial crisis reinvigorated ongoing debates over whether China has its own distinct and separate 'model' of political economy and/or development. There is much that connects this Chinese model with previous systems of national political economies; partly in terms of specific policy preferences, but also in terms of shared basic conceptions of the distribution of power in the global order. Like these previous systems, China has come to stand as an example of an alternative to following dominant (neo-)liberal models of development. In this respect, what the China model is not and what China does not stand for might be more important than what it actually is and what it does stand for. However, the idea of a coherent and unique Chinese model has considerable purchase, and is both informed by and also feeds into considerations of China's uniqueness and difference from the norms, ideas and philosophies that dominate the rest of the world.
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| 7 |
ID:
144204
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Whilst there is a general acceptance amongst Chinese analysts that the country's global power has really increased (and for very good reasons), how best to use this power to generate real change in the global order remains a subject of considerable debate. The nature of that international order itself is a key determinant of what China can do. On one level the rise of new powers is leading to a depolarised order with fluid and changing alliances that create possibilities for China to build partnerships for change. But on another level, the residual power of the US creates clear limits on what can be done. This creates a rather unique set of circumstances where a partially dissatisfied rising power has to try to find ways to responsibly change (but not fracture) the existing system as self-perceived No.2, with the No.1 rather reluctant to accept the No.2's agenda.
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| 8 |
ID:
146484
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The rise of China has been reshaping how the country sees its own role in the world. China has become increasingly willing to move from being a norm and system taker to a norm and system shaper (if not yet maker). One example is Xi Jinping's promotion of ‘a new type of Great Power relations’ designed to create a strategic space in which to operate. By using a mixed quantitative/qualitative analysis, we analyse 141 Chinese articles titled with ‘new type of Great Power relations’. We find that although Chinese analysts and policy makers rejected the idea of a G2 in 2009, the mainstream discourse has rapidly shifted to what we call a ‘G2 with Chinese characteristics’ which indicates a fundamental shift in Chinese evaluation of the power status of itself and others. While some Chinese scholars consider China to have already achieved the status as the world's No. 2 or even a superpower, the mainstream discourse views China as both a Great Power and a rising power at the same time. This, we argue, moderates the expectations of what China can and should do to resolve global problems despite its great power status.
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| 9 |
ID:
097921
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the development of an increasingly sophisticated literature on comparative regional integration drawing from a variety of cases, the European experience remains the most often used benchmark against which other integrative processes are judged; there is still an often implicit expectation that 'successful' processes of regionalism will end up looking something like the European Union. While it is correct to move away from such a 'Euro-dominance', the theoretical lessons learned continue to have salience when applied to emerging and competing forms of integrative processes in East Asia. In particular, when economic considerations dominate regional relations - at times of economic crises - then integrative logics and strategies come to the fore. In more 'normal' times when geo-strategic considerations reassert themselves, then the consensus over region building and the very nature of the region itself is weakened and cooperation is replaced by competing visions and the over-supply of region.
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| 10 |
ID:
177653
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| Summary/Abstract |
While differences remain, the gap between US and European debates over the likely impact of China’s rise on the
global order has narrowed in recent years. At the same time,
China’s leaders have been more confident in establishing
dichotomized distinctions between their view of how the
world should be ordered and how China will act as a great
power on one hand, and what they depict as the West’s preferences and the typical modus operandi of Western powers
on the other. Despite evidence of ever clearer dividing lines
between different visions of China’s impact on the future of
the global order, this is not the same as a return to bipolarity. The problems of disentangling transnational economic
relations, different levels of followership for potential leaders, and pragmatic considerations of governance efficacy in
diverse issue areas all suggest something other than fixed
bloc-type alliances on either side of a bipolar divide.
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| 11 |
ID:
192157
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this introduction to the special issue, we establish the overarching objective for the collection; to investigate the salience and efficacy of conceptions of Economic Statecraft (ES) and Geoeconomics for understanding and explaining shifts in state-market relationships in a number of regional political economies. After a very short overview of different generations of ES research, we establish the set of common questions that each of the papers address, and how we arrived at them as the research project evolved. We point to the importance of ensuring that ES is not just thought of as something that the more powerful regional states engage in, and the need to adopt a three-part analytical distinction between different components of ES: motivations and objectives; actions and tools; and outcomes and consequences. This allows us to trace the relationship between goals and effects, provides a basis for comparative studies, and makes it easier to make a distinction between ES and other forms of state involvement in the economy.
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| 12 |
ID:
093889
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The papers in this special edition are a very small selection from those presented at the EU-NESCA (Network of European Studies Centres in Asia) conference on "the EU and East Asia within an Evolving Global Order: Ideas, Actors and Processes" in November 2008 in Brussels. The conference was the culmination of three years of research activity involving workshops and conferences bringing together scholars from both regions primarily to discuss relations between Europe and Asia, perceptions of Europe in Asia, and the relationship between the European regional project and emerging regional forms in Asia. But although this was the last of the three major conferences organised by the consortium, it in many ways represented a starting point rather than the end; an opportunity to reflect on the conclusions of the first phase of collaboration and point towards new and continuing research agendas for the future.
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| 13 |
ID:
135051
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| Summary/Abstract |
The reappearance of substantial debt in China after 2008 has refocused attention on the sustainability of the existing financial ‘model’. It’s not just that ‘traditional’ forms of bank-centred debt have re-emerged, but that the informal ‘shadow banking’ sector also seems increasingly fragile, generating debts that do not seem easy to repay. Explanations for the current situation focus on the way in which China responded to the global financial crisis, and on the incentives that exist to go outside the formal and more regulated banking system into often riskier activities. But there are more fundamental structural issues. The current financial system contains within it some of the dna of its predecessor, while the spatial distribution of power and authority is inextricably linked to the way the financial system functions. While it might be possible to tinker with some elements of current financial problems, the relationship between local government financing, land, the banking system and key economic sectors makes it difficult to resolve more structural issues without taking a holistic approach; one that would have fundamental consequences for the nature of the Chinese state, and the distribution of power within it.
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| 14 |
ID:
158386
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| Summary/Abstract |
While much of the debate over the implications of China’s rise tends to dichotomise around either status quo or revisionist predictions, the reality seems to lie somewhere in between. In broad terms, China has embraced multilateral forms of cooperation and governance. This does not mean, however, that it is satisfied with the distribution of power in many international institutions, or some of the norms and principles that underpin them. This has resulted in a reformist position, with China increasingly willing to offer its own supplementary alternatives. China’s rise has also provided an important economic alternative to dealing with the West, and considerably undermined the ability of others to establish their preferences and world views. China’s lack of commitment to democracy and the external promotion of human rights remains a key reason why some analysts remain unconvinced about the long-term ambitions of an illiberal actor in a global liberal order.
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| 15 |
ID:
058093
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| 16 |
ID:
061261
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| 17 |
ID:
102378
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2010.
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| Description |
xiii, 259p.
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| Standard Number |
9781857435085, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055810 | 327.51/BRE 055810 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
190669
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the UK government’s response to international order transition as seen through its recent foreign policy ‘tilt’ toward the ‘Indo-Pacific’. It suggests that in post-Brexit Britain the determinants of foreign policy are increasingly complex involving an attempt to balance domestic policy, manage internal party conflict and establish an “independent” position in international relations in the context of US attempts to build a “grand alliance” against China. Our central argument is that the UK policy shift toward the Indo-Pacific is informed in large part by a changing dominant narrative on China and in particular by perceptions of China as “systemic competitor” in the global political economy. We argue that not only is the “tilt” at this point in time based on rather questionable assumptions regarding the UK’s relationship with the ‘region’ but that ‘international order transition’ is more complex than is suggested by the new UK policy orientation. Limited in terms of conventional military power, the UK tilt strategy focuses on effecting institutional and normative change and positions the UK as a ‘soft power superpower’ alongside the United States in the region. In the context of renewed international political and economic crisis the “tilt” expresses the contradictions that lie at the heart of UK foreign policy rather than offering a clearly defined and viable new orientation for “global Britain.”
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| 19 |
ID:
098822
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| Publication |
Los Angeles, Sage, 2010.
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| Description |
4vol set; xxxviii, 369p.
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| Series |
Sage library of international relations
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| Contents |
Vol. I: Theorising international politics
Vol. II: Security
Vol. III: Political economy of development
Vol. IV: Regions and regionalism
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| Standard Number |
9781412947831, hbk
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Copies: C:4/I:0,R:4,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055226 | 327.5/BRE 055226 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
| 055227 | 327.5/BRE 055227 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
| 055228 | 327.5/BRE 055228 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
| 055229 | 327.5/BRE 055229 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 20 |
ID:
066917
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