Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
075493
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2 |
ID:
031880
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Publication |
Shrewsbury, England, Tri-Service Press Ltd, 1955.
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Description |
xxv, 266p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
0-87021-372-5
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
031676 | 940.545952/FUC 031676 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
071192
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4 |
ID:
138706
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Summary/Abstract |
Since 2005, when Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway was published, there has been much discussion about its conclusions. Likewise, in the course of time there have appeared books like John Lundstrom’s Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Dallas Isom’s Midway Inquest, Elliot Carlson’s Rochefort’s War, and Craig Symonds’s The Battle of Midway, and several articles of note. One of the most interesting interpretations of the battle is Midway Inquest, which came out in 2006. While we cannot accept all of Isom’s arguments, he does make a key point—that Admiral Nagumo Chūichi and his 1st Air Fleet staff have been scapegoated, given too much of the blame for the Midway debacle. This is particularly true when it comes to the supposedly faulty reconnaissance arrangements utilized during the battle.
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5 |
ID:
058125
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Publication |
London, HMSO, 1995.
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Description |
2v. (vii, 154; ix, 287p.)hbk
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Contents |
Vol. 1: Background to the war
Vol. 2: Defensive phase
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Standard Number |
0117728187
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
036657 | 940.540952/GRE 036657 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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6 |
ID:
186396
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Summary/Abstract |
New sources of information reveal that in the run-up to the crucial Pacific War Battle of Midway, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was willing to fight a potential five enemy carriers with two of his own, if Yorktown could not be repaired in time. Why would Nimitz accept those odds, and what likely would have been the outcome had such a battle taken place?
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