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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
058429
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| Publication |
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004.
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| Description |
viii, 153p.
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| Standard Number |
0742536009
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049051 | 327.730090511/HOF 049051 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
091284
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In July 1990, a troubled Hubert Védrine, François Mitterrand's strategic adviser and spokesman, wrote to Zbigniew Brzezinski. He was frustrated with an interview that the former U.S. national security adviser under Jimmy Carter had given to a leading French daily newspaper a few days before. In the interview (Moscow had just given its final green light to German unification by accepting that Germany would remain a full North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member), Brzezinski, a widely respected pundit, had declared that "for many years, we have known that the end of the Cold War would make two winners: the United States and Germany, and two losers: the Soviet Union and France."1 Responding to what in his eyes was a "debatable" viewpoint "to say the least," Védrine argued that France, since General de Gaulle in the 1960s and under Mitterrand throughout the 1980s, had in fact made persistent efforts to overcome the Cold War and its consequences. Denying that its policies had been premised on the enduring division of Germany, he emphasized that "the German unification process had unfolded in accordance with what the French President had wished as early as July 1989." In any case, Védrine concluded, it made no sense to designate victors and vanquished in the Cold War.
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