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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
081123
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| Publication |
Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2008.
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| Description |
xxi, 345p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781845191887
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053235 | 956.046/SHE 053235 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
071399
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| 3 |
ID:
100747
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The secret talks between Jordan and Israel began in 1963 and continued until the two countries signed the peace treaty in 1994. The talks are unique in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The post-Six-Day War talks were held on two tracks: one between Yaakov Herzog, the Director of the PM's office and Zayd al-Rifa'i, King Hussein's private secretary; the second, on a higher level, between Israeli ministers Yigal Allon and Abba Eban and the king. The two sides moved on parallel lines that could never meet. Constraints on both sides contributed to the inevitable logjam. The king genuinely hoped to reach a peace with Israel based on the principles of the Arab Summit and his talks with Nasser. Israel, on the other hand, was reluctant to commit itself to enter into peace negotiations with Jordan, avoiding serious discussion on the principles of peace. Instead it presented the Allon Plan for discussion with the king. Thus, the gap in the positions on the talks' goals, in the components of the solution to the conflict and the peace settlement was unbridgeable. Despite this impasse both parties felt it was in their common interest to pursue the talks, which became a goal in itself. The gap was not only in the concept of peace and talks' objectives, but in all core issues related to peace, such as the territorial issue, especially the status of Jerusalem, and interpretation of UNSCR 242. With hindsight, the core issues in the solution to the West Bank remain unchanged, but the Palestinians replaced Jordan as the main Arab party to determining the future of the West Bank.
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| 4 |
ID:
082287
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On the thirtieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, there were lengthy discussions about the war's repercussions, on the element of surprise, operational failures, Israel's intelligence blunders, and the poison darts that Israeli generals flung at one another. Terra incognita among the conferences, articles, and interviews was an analysis of the origins of Sadat's strategic volte-face after he acceded to power in late September 1970, and his steps prior to and after the war. This article analyzes the origins this determining factor behind his decision to pursue limited objectives in the October 1973 War and to visit Jerusalem in November 1977. It has been assumed that Sadat's peace initiative was the direct result of Egypt's strategic victory in the 1973 war. However, the war's initiative-and especially its results-only accelerated the political process that Sadat began in 1971
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| 5 |
ID:
049989
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 2003.
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| Description |
x, 186p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0714652962
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 047402 | 956/GAM 047402 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
058838
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