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1 |
ID:
124016
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
While the United States has signed on to reduce its nuclear arsenal, the U.S. sea-based missile force remains crucial in a world where deterrence still matters.
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2 |
ID:
106259
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
The bipartisan Congressional Strategy Posture Commission offered numerous recommendations to reduce what it labeled "the nuclear danger." The Obama Administration has pursued some of these recommendations via its policy documents, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, its budgets, and plans. There is reason, however, for several concerns in this regard. These involve the high priority placed on nuclear force reductions at the potential expense of other national goals, including deterrence and assurance; the maintenance of the flexibility and resilience of the U.S. force posture necessary to meet deterrence and assurance requirements now and in the future; continued support for U.S. strategic defensive capabilities given Russian opposition; and apparent interest among some in the Administration to move increasingly toward what has been termed a policy of Minimum Deterrence.
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3 |
ID:
105009
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
his article examines the preparation of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Obama Administration. In doing so it seeks to answer a puzzle: why is there such a gap between the vision of a 'world free of nuclear weapons' set out by President Obama in his Prague speech of 2009 and the significantly more modest outcomes of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review? The question is answered by employing the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm developed by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin. It is argued that the answer lies in the fierce bureaucratic battles that are playing out within the administration, with both routine decision making and the outcomes of political games affecting the eventual NPR.
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4 |
ID:
098321
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) emphasis two realities, first the challenge of
nuclear terrorism and proliferation; and second, it affirms the end of the Cold
War rivalries. But the "resetting" of relationship with Moscow had created an
enemy vacuum for the U.S. To fill this gap, North Korea has been constructed
as an enemy which justifies the continuity of the "nuclear umbrella" in the
Northeast Asian region. But as an asymmetrical, surrogate enemy it is actually
the pretext to maintain 'critical bases' in Northeast Asia which functions as
hubs for U.S. global military power projection. The U.S. interprets its security
in terms of its primacy and any perceptible shift from this position makes it
feel insecure. This ontological security seeking of the U.S. makes the existence
of security dilemma de rigueur in Northeast Asia and prods the U.S. to take a
hard line approach towards North Korea.
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5 |
ID:
062282
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6 |
ID:
162693
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Summary/Abstract |
In 1996, renowned U.S. defense expert Fred Iklé proposed that the nuclear drama of the past decades had entered its more volatile second act.1
1 Fred Charles Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (1996).
View all notes
Soon after, the term “second nuclear age” began to be widely used among nuclear strategists.2
2 Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Paul J. Bracken, Fire in The East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1999).
View all notes
Unlike the first age, marked by bipolar competition with the Soviet Union, the main challenge of the second age would come from belligerent regional powers equipped with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missile technology. However, this era was not thought to last forever—for Professor Colin Gray, even in 1996, wrote the “second nuclear age can be seen as a period of interregnum between irregular cyclical surges in the kind of great power rivalry that organizes many strands in the course of strategic history.”
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7 |
ID:
069799
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8 |
ID:
093906
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9 |
ID:
058608
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10 |
ID:
192145
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Summary/Abstract |
As US officials have grown more anxious about the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, they have placed renewed emphasis on nuclear-assurance measures. The hope is that closer exercises and consultations can reassure allies, strengthen deterrence postures and reduce the risk that an ally could pursue their own nuclear weapons. However, recent developments in the US–South Korea alliance suggest that nuclear assurance is not only ineffective at reassuring Seoul but may also be fuelling proliferation risks. By raising the salience of nuclear weapons within the alliance, nuclear assurance reinforces the fiction that South Korea’s defence depends on nuclear use. Misunderstanding the risks and potential of nuclear assurance has fuelled calls for a South Korean nuclear-weapons programme and obstructed the alliance’s ability to adapt and improve its deterrence posture.
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11 |
ID:
160795
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Summary/Abstract |
The latest NPR released in 2018 under the watch of President Trump, unabashedly echoes the sentiment of America First. Many nuclear war-fighting issues and concepts that had been settled in the past after having been experimented with and discarded for the risks they carried have yet again been adopted by the current NPR. But, America’s sole focus on its own security alone could end up creating more security dilemmas for the US, and others. This article identifies the main highlights of the NPR, as well as its limitations, and the implications of both for nuclear strategies of major nuclear players. It describes and analyses the context, the content and the consequences of the NPR. It specifically flags some issues/actions that India must particularly watch out for since some of these need to be monitored for their implications on the nuclear strategies and trajectories of India’s nuclear armed neighbours.
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12 |
ID:
188458
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Summary/Abstract |
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated nuclear threats in connection with the war in Ukraine since Russia invaded on 24 February 2022, and senior Russian military leaders have reportedly considered when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. On 27 October, in this context of rising nuclear risks, the US Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review. It describes the present moment as a time to prepare rather than negotiate. Although now is not the time to begin negotiations towards a formal arms-control treaty, the end of the war in Ukraine will be an important opportunity for pursuing post-crisis arms-control efforts. Meanwhile, during this arms-control interlude, the United States and its allies should lay the groundwork for future arms-control efforts.
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