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| 1 |
ID:
092962
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the consequences of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and the unfocused US response to that war. It describes the negative tendencies in both Russian behavior and European security that were illuminated by the war, and concludes that the West, including the United States, suffered serious geopolitical defeats, with consequences that have not yet been remedied or overcome. Therefore, the West's security situation vis-à-vis Russia and Central Eurasia remains fraught with potential serious dangers.
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| 2 |
ID:
089336
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| Publication |
2009.
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The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 had profoundly negative consequences for European security, which were exacerbated by the inability of the US and Europe, either individually or collectively, to offer any resistance to this aggression. Thus this war and its aftermath showed the effects of incoherent policy-making, enfeebled political will and disunity in the Western alliance. For Washington it also represented a harvest of a misconceived policy towards Georgia that lost control over Georgian policy and may have contributed to Tbilisi's recklessness.
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| 3 |
ID:
108563
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has clearly emulated Russia's previous example of making loud claims and
increasing military patrols in the Arctic. China will likely become a major player
in Arctic trade routes and become a main destination for goods shipped through
the Northern Sea Route. It is likely that a significant part of future Russian oil
and gas production will ultimately be supplied to China. What are the strategic
implications of China's active involvement in Arctic politics? The Arctic "Great
Game" is often described as a new Cold War between the United States and Russia.
Regionally, the two main protagonists are Russia and Norway. This article makes a
different argument. The Arctic has recently become an issue on the Russo-Chinese,
and possibly Russo-Japanese security agenda. The first goal of this article is to
examine the Arctic policy and strategy of Russia, perhaps the most difficult nation
to understand in terms of Arctic security. The second goal of the article is to
explain how the Arctic has become an issue of concern in Russia's relationship
with China.
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| 4 |
ID:
156478
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Russian policy in Asia and in the Arctic share significantly overlapping elements.
One such element is the precedent set when the UN awarded the Sea of Okhotsk
to Moscow in 2013. Moscow’s subsequent conduct in closing that sea to foreign
shipping and creating a naval bastion there suggest that it may well do the same
should part or all of its very expansive claim to the Arctic zone off its territory
be recognized by the UN. Inasmuch as Russia has now militarized the Sea of
Okhotsk on the heels of the UN award and added thereby innumerable obstacles
to rapprochement with Japan while also militarizing the area still further, the
likelihood of an Arctic bastion, closed zone, and subsequent militarization cannot
be excluded. Meanwhile, in Asia, Russia will continue to remain at odds with Japan
and see much of Asia as composed of hostile and threatening powers that can only
be dealt with in a context of militarization.
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| 5 |
ID:
062197
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| Publication |
Spring/Summer 2005.
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| 6 |
ID:
152676
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| 7 |
ID:
099710
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration's reset policy with Russia focuses on certain key issues in the Russo-American relationship: arms control, as embodied in the new Prague treaty called New Start, gaining Russian support for U.S. pressure on Iran, and gaining Russian support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. This article closely examines the arms control and Iranian issues as well as the broader issue of Russo-American rivalry over Eurasian security, perhaps the core issue in the relationship and certainly the most contentious one there. The analysis suggests that there are numerous problems with the treaty that go beyond the issue of whether or not it allows the U.S. to build missile defenses. It also suggests that there are unproven and even unjustified assumptions about Russian policy regarding Iran and regional security that reduce the real value and prospective gains of this policy for the U.S.
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| 8 |
ID:
079463
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| 9 |
ID:
111883
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Asia, where nuclear powers already interact (including North Korea), exerts a growing influence on the thinking and policy underlying Russia's current and future nuclear (and overall defense) posture. China's rise is forcing Russia into a greater reliance on strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. These in turn will reinforce its opposition to US missile defenses, not only in Europe but also in Asia. Russia must now entertain the possibility of nuclear use in regional conflicts that would otherwise remain purely conventional. It cannot be postulated blindly that nuclear weapons serve no discernible purpose other than to deter nuclear attacks by other nuclear powers. The strategic equation in Asia and in the Russian Far East convincingly demonstrates the falsity of this approach. Nuclear weapons will be the essential component of Russia's regional defense policy if not of its overall policies - and this also includes contingencies in Europe.
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| 10 |
ID:
093907
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| 11 |
ID:
148077
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The Russo-Chinese relationship is one of the most important relationships in both Asian and international security. It is undergoing dynamic evolution as a result of the Russian war in Ukraine. This article stresses that the bilateral relationship is one where both Moscow and Beijing espouse the logic of the strategic triangle vis-a-vis the United States. But Washington renounces the effort to deal with Russia and its Asian relations as a strategic entity. Moreover, over the last 12-18 months, although Russia has sought an independent standing in Asia apart from China, it is increasingly unable to compete with China or assert that independence, due to its invasion of Ukraine, isolation from the West, sanctions, and failed economic policies. Thus, it is losing out to China and becoming more dependent on it. These trends are apparent in Russian policies towards Japan, the two Koreas, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.
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| 12 |
ID:
111791
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| 13 |
ID:
128424
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| Publication |
2014.
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The Arctic, always before on the frigid edges of the international imagination, is becoming a hot topic in world affairs, particularly in Asia, because of its virtually untapped resources and increasing strategic importance. In 2012, the amount of cargo transported through the region more than doubled, and in May 2013 the Arctic Council, traditionally membered by Europe's Nordic countries, along with Russia, Canada, and the US, granted observer status to China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Italy, a reminder that climate change is opening the Arctic to wider use and commercial exploitation, especially by Asian interests. Indeed, a Chinese shipping company sent that country's first commercial voyage through the Arctic in September 2013. And Russia is negotiating with Korean shippers about using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for energy shipments. These developments are already bringing the Arctic and Asian security agendas together, and in the process changing Asia's strategic boundaries and planning.
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| 14 |
ID:
065845
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| 15 |
ID:
064843
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| 16 |
ID:
106734
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| 17 |
ID:
137509
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia views its military exports as a major tool for achieving its national security interests, particularly, in the East Asia and the Middle East. The arms trade is an integral part of its image as a world power, a critical part of its relationship with other states in Asia, a central element in its defense and security agreements, and an essential component of its ability to obtain and maintain access to influence and resources in regions of interest. So, while it is true that Russia does sell arms and military equipment to generate revenue and extend production runs for its defense industry, it is erroneous to claim that this in the central driver behind Russia’s arms trade. Russia seeks to maintain and expand its status as a world power, and views the focused, purposeful export of its military technologies to key countries as a fundamental tool in achieving this.
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| 18 |
ID:
076436
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| 19 |
ID:
188264
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In 2020 Russia acquired a new naval base or logistic support centre off Sudan’s coast in Port Sudan. This base represents the culmination to date of Moscow’s quest for bases in and around the Mediterranean, Horn of Africa, and even the Indian Ocean. While the politics of obtaining and developing this base pertain largely to Moscow’s Africa policy; this paper focuses upon Russia’s overall naval strategy and its linked power projection programme. These strategies have hitherto been insufficiently appreciated abroad and it is hoped that this assessment will galvanise greater attention to them.
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| 20 |
ID:
192615
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| Summary/Abstract |
If we examine the role played by nuclear weapons in Russia's war against Ukraine, we find that they play an offensive role in Russian strategy. The deterrence mission is as much intended to free Russia's hands for conventional war on its periphery as it is intended to prevent a nuclear first strike from the West. Indeed, the evidence of exercises etc. strongly points to a readiness for attacking Western sea-lines of communication in the Atlantic were a Western response to come as a result of the attack on Ukraine. Similarly, the potential for nuclear threat exists in the vicinity of the Black Sea as shown by Russian exercises in advance of the war there and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those exercises reveal that Moscow's power projection policy into the Levant and beyond is also part of its deterrence strategy and has amongst its objectives protecting the Black Sea as a Russian lake, an inherently offensive posture. Therefore Russia's nuclear strategy in this war and in general stand revealed as offensive ones which the West must reckon with.
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