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1 |
ID:
134061
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
When Socialist intellectual John Strachey was appointed as Secretary of State for War in 1950, his pre-war record as a Marxist writer with close connections to the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) became a matter of public debate. A bitter campaign was run against him in the Beaverbrook press, and some members of the US defense and nuclear establishment pressed for an embargo on sensitive information being passed to the UK War Office. American suspicion of the political reliability of the Labour government was heightened by the appointment, but this does not explain how and why some Americans were so hostile to Strachey. The FBI's dossier on his pre-war activities, circulated amongst his American critics, documented Strachey's supposed secret membership of the CPGB's Central Committee. MI5 and Special Branch files show that this supposition was based on faulty intelligence. The readiness of American anti-Soviet protagonists to lend credence to such suspicions contrasts with the relaxed view of Strachey's past that was taken in Whitehall. Both positions were characteristic of their time, and of this stage in the Anglo-American alliance. This paper explores the ways in which American insecurities and a British climate of tolerance towards fellow travellers shaped the way that episode played out.
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2 |
ID:
127131
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
In January 1950 President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would proceed with further work to determine the feasibility of a 'Super', or hydrogen, bomb. The events leading up to that decision - counter-pressures and advocacy from a number of quarters, including the divided Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the nuclear scientists, Congress and the Pentagon - is well known. Less attention has been given to how the story of the Super came to be told in official and popular publications. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, rogue member of the AEC, later presidential adviser on atomic affairs and AEC chairman, was one of the most vigorous advocates of developing thermonuclear weapons. He was also a highly skilled player of bureaucratic politics. This article draws upon the Strauss archives to examine how he used his position and his contacts to shape the history of the H-bomb to his own political advantage.
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3 |
ID:
058763
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4 |
ID:
121543
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Post-1945 U.S. war planning assumed that a strike on the Soviet Union would be prosecuted by B-29s flying the atomic bomb from forward bases in East Anglia, England, where in 1946 bomb preparation and loading facilities were established at disused airfields. In 1950, atomic-capable aircraft, complete with bomb components, were first deployed to England, amidst anxieties about sabotage and a pre-emptive Soviet air strike. This establishment of a U.S. atomic strike capability in England arose from an entirely informal arrangement based on mutual trust. That informality would soon engender concern in Britain as the lack of symmetry in Anglo-American atomic relations became more apparent.
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5 |
ID:
072374
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Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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Description |
xii, 238p.
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Standard Number |
0415368898
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
051325 | 331.544095/HEW 051325 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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