| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
097651
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article studies the Darfur conflict from within the African Union (AU) framework for conflict resolution and peacekeeping and critically examines the operational effectiveness of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
094610
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
101766
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Humanitarian advocacy is emblematic of the relief community's desire to move beyond simply treating the symptoms of suffering, and towards tackling the causes. As such, advocacy is at the front line of debates over where the boundaries between aid and politics should now be drawn and the point where dissension on the subject is most evident. In this paper the challenge that advocacy poses for traditional humanitarian operations in Darfur and the effect of such political engagement on humanitarian identity more generally is assessed. Disagreement among humanitarian organisations is exacerbated by the continued tendency of aid agencies to privilege reaction over reflection. Floundering between unachievable traditional humanitarian principles and the failure of human rights to provide an adequate alternative, humanitarianism is swiftly losing both its identity and its legitimacy. To emerge from the fog of confusion humanitarianism must now take on the professionalism of military science and endeavour to better know both itself and its enemies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
080843
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While the crisis in Darfur simmers, the larger problem of Sudan's survival as a state is becoming increasingly urgent. Old tensions between the Arabs of the Nile River valley, who have held power for a century, and marginalized groups on the country's periphery are turning into a national crisis. Engagement with Khartoum may be the only way to avert another civil war in Sudan, and even that may not be enough
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
075070
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
117045
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Most people hold that in its quest for natural resources abroad, China shields rogue states with egregious human-rights record from international opprobrium and sanctions. Its political support for Sudan is a case in point. By examining Chinese perspectives on humanitarian intervention and national sovereignty, this article first argues that Beijing's interests are so multiple and complex that concern about the implications of humanitarian intervention for national integration is more crucial than oil in determining its policy towards Sudan. Paradoxically it asserts that China, a non-democratic country, is more influential than liberal democratic states in making the rules of humanitarian intervention in Darfur because of a lack of political will in the West. In addition, there are early signs that China intends to utilise its newfound power to remake international rules regarding territorial sovereignty. Further development is likely to be shaped by its interactions with the United States.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
117784
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
141989
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
|
| Description |
232p.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
9789384464851
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058368 | 341.5845106/HER 058368 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
154711
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay argues that UN Security Council responses to internal armed conflict are the product of the interests as well as the causal and principled beliefs of its engaged permanent members. As China has grown from a regional to a global actor, it has become a more active participant in Council deliberations. The cases of East Timor and Darfur highlight the ways in which Council decisions have come to reflect Chinese understanding of the causes of peace and conflict and appropriate peace strategies. The future of UN peace operations will depend on the ability of the Council's engaged participants to discover shared interests and points of convergence in their causal and principled beliefs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
080875
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
By 2008, what is commonly known as the EU's `capability-expectations gap' has narrowed considerably. While the EU has made notable improvements in terms of its resource availability, as well as the instruments at its disposal, a gap between what the EU member-states are expected to do in the world and what they are actually able to agree upon persists. This article argues that the primary reason why the European Union is unable to deliver the foreign and security policies expected is a lack of decisionmaking procedures capable of overcoming dissent. Repeated attempts to surmount the drawbacks of consensus policymaking have only marginally improved the consistency and effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These efforts are assessed by applying consensus as a `conceptual lens' through which to select and assess information. The real-world impact of the lack of cohesiveness, the capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them, is illustrated by Europe's handling of the crisis in the Sudanese province of Darfur in the period 2003-08. The main finding of the article is that as long as the consensus-expectations gap exists, the EU is likely to remain a partial and inconsistent foreign policy actor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
155690
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the Joint Mission Analysis Centre's (JMAC) field information and analysis capacity through systematically comparing JMAC's data collection in Darfur to an event-level conflict dataset based on open-source information. This comparison shows that JMAC's data collection in Darfur over the studied period is much more comprehensive and precise than any publicly available data on conflict events currently available. In addition, this article demonstrates how peacekeeping data could be used to guide the leadership of peacekeeping missions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
080102
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
084677
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In-class simulations can offer students an excellent opportunity to apply the lessons they have learned in a practical and fun manner. The literature on active learning in international relations demonstrates the many values simulations possess. In running a simulation on the conflict in Darfur, I identified an additional potential value in in-class simulations: they can be a technique for tempering student idealism. Students often fail to appreciate the disconnect between their personal political convictions and the political realities that impede conflict resolution. Simulations allow students to apply theory to practice in a way that encourages students to temper their idealism by acknowledging political realities on the ground. I discuss how a week-long simulation on Darfur encouraged students to balance idealism and realism and understand why reaching agreements in the international community can be so difficult.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
079881
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2007.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When official representatives of more than 170 countries adopted the principle of the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) at the September 2005 World Summit, Darfur was quickly identified as the test case for this new doctrine. The general verdict is that the international community has failed the test due to lack of political will. This article argues that the failure is real but that it is more fundamentally located within the doctrine of R2P itself. Fulfilling the aspiration of R2P demands an international protection capability that does not exist now and cannot be realistically expected. The critical weakness in R2P is that the 'responsibility to react' has been framed as coercive protection, which attempts to be a middle way between classic peacekeeping and outright military intervention that can be undertaken without the consent of the host government. Thus far, theoretical and practical attempts to create this intermediate space for coercive protection have failed to resolve basic strategic and operational issues. In addition, the very act of raising the prospect of external military intervention for human protection purposes changes and distorts the political process and can in fact make a resolution more difficult. Following an introductory section that provides background to the war in Darfur and international engagement, this article examines the debates over the R2P that swirled around the Darfur crisis and operational concepts developed for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its hybrid successor, the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), especially during the Abuja peace negotiations. Three operational concepts are examined: ceasefire, disarmament and civilian protection. Unfortunately, the international policy priority o bringing UN troops to Darfur had an adverse impact on the Darfur peace talks without grappling with the central question of what international forces would do to resolve the crisis. Advocacy for the R2P set an unrealistic ideal which became the enemy of achievable goals
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
074502
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
089142
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the past half-decade, those Americans following international affairs have been inundated by media accounts of genocide in Darfur, supplemented by full-page advertisments in the major newspaper, sponsored mostly by the save Darfur Coalition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
058777
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
084355
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Low expectations and international impatience forced the African Union to shift from a classical integrative approach to negotiations to "deadline diplomacy" during the final months of the Abuja talks between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel movements. As a result, the AU mediators - who had served as communicators and formulators - assumed the responsibility of manipulators. This transition scuttled plans for gradually arriving at the implementing details for a formula. Instead, acquiescence to power served as the chief reason for the signature of one of the movements, while the mediators showed disinterest and inflexibility in reigning in the other two movements that required a package of additional threats and inducements. Important lessons regarding the credibility of deadlines, the appropriateness of the formula, the necessity of ownership, inclusivity/exclusivity of the talks, and sufficient support for the movements in the prenegotiation and diagnosis phases can be drawn from the Abuja process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
124518
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There has been much debate in many forums to seek a settlement of the Darfur conflict (DC), but no study has addressed its economic cost. This study is the first attempt to quantify the economic cost of the DC. The war's costs include the destruction of infrastructure, direct military spending attributable to the war effort, and the impact of the latter on capital formation. In addition, the human destruction - loss of life and income - must be taken into account. Our calculations show that the government of Sudan has incurred costs totaling US$30.5 billion, equivalent to 171% of 2003 Gross Domestic Product GDP, on the war in Darfur. This includes $10.1 billion in direct military expenses; $7.2 billion in the lost productivity of internally displaces persons; $2.6 billion in foregone lifetime earnings of the dead; $4.1 billion in infrastructure damage; and $6.5 billion in war impacts on GDP. The total costs of the war are $41.5 billion if we added military spillover and African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur peace-keeping operations of $10.9 billion. While the country has spent only 1.3% of its budget on public health and less than 1% on education over the past two decades. The war consumes 13% of GDP in a society that lacks the means to provide the basic entitlements of education, food, health care, and shelter to its people.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
117861
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Celebrities have been accused of oversimplifying the conflict in Darfur, of exaggerating the number of people killed and of cursorily labelling it the 'first genocide of the 21st century'. Celebrity activists have also been criticized for advocating drastic measures like military intervention, and for aggressively pursuing the fulfilment of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court at the expense of quiet diplomacy and reconciliation, ultimately making matters worse. This article examines the role of two Hollywood celebrities-Mia Farrow and George Clooney-in Sudan's 'messy war'. It claims that most proponents and critics of celebrity activism overestimate the role that these two individuals played. Clooney and Farrow did not act alone but were latecomer adherents to a transnational advocacy network (the Save Darfur Coalition) and their role was more in strengthening than in altering messages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|