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| 1 |
ID:
146995
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent developments in European security have shown the growing need for a better understanding of the security dynamics on the European continent. This article presents an analysis of differing Russian and European perceptions of European security in general, and concerning the crisis in Ukraine in particular. As much of the literature on these issues has been normatively driven, we aim to provide an impartial presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and intentions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is ultimately dangerous or counterproductive. With this article we offer a modest contribution towards discouraging such a development in Russia–EU relations. After presenting an analysis of the differing EU and Russian perceptions, we discuss the potential for dialogue between such different worldviews, and reflect on potential implications for European security. As the article shows, there are tendencies of a certain adjustment in the Union’s approach that may make a partial rapprochement between the two sides more likely.
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| 2 |
ID:
067515
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2006.
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| Description |
xiii, 226p.
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| Series |
Contemporary security studies
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| Standard Number |
0415380227
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050574 | 327.1160948/RIE 050574 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
058981
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| 4 |
ID:
123568
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sarkozy's decision to bring France back into NATO's integrated military structure in 2009 represents in some ways a break with French exceptionalism. But how deep is this change? This article examines whether the decision has led to a real integration of France along various dimensions of integration; whether the decision represents a continuation or a break with the traditional French approach and the effects of this reintegration on NATO/EU cooperation. The empirical analysis of French political and military practices in NATO combines a focus on macro-level foreign policy formulations with a micro-level study of how French officials and representatives communicate and interact on a day-to-day basis. The analysis shows that France has become increasingly integrated into NATO since 2009 on most dimensions except with regard to cultural integration. Thus, France may be reintegrated in practice, but not yet in principle.
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| 5 |
ID:
075728
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of why various Norwegian governments of recent years have been willing to contribute to European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations and integrate into the ESDP structures despite their country's increasingly limited access to the decision-making and/or decision-shaping process in this policy area. Norway participates in most of the ESDP structures in one way or the other-it contributes with troops and personnel to ESDP operations, participates in a battle group and has an association agreement with the European Defence Agency. The result of Norway's will to integrate is that, as a non-member, it has become more integrated into the ESDP structures than members such as Denmark, who have chosen to opt out from this policy area. How can this be explained? Does the Norwegian government decide to participate because that is seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests, or are there other institutional or normative explanations for this policy choice?
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| 6 |
ID:
164650
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union (EU) has spent considerable time and energy on defining and refining its comprehensive approach to external conflicts. The knock-on effects of new and protracted crises, from the war in Ukraine to the multi-faceted armed conflicts in the Sahel and the wider Middle East, have made the improvement of external crisis-response capacities a top priority. But has the EU managed to plug the capability–expectations gap, and develop an effective, comprehensive and conflict sensitive crisis-response capability? Drawing on institutional theory and an approach developed by March and Olsen, this article analyses whether the EU has the administrative capacities needed in order to be an effective actor in this area and implement a policy in line with the established goals and objectives identified in its comprehensive approach.
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| 7 |
ID:
068132
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