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| 1 |
ID:
132081
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The NATO summit in Wales will be one of the most important since the Cold War ended - the first such summit after what is, undeniably, the end of the post-Cold War era. The goals of transitioning Afghanistan operations, preparing NATO for future challenges, and cementing the transatlantic bond have all been lent urgency by the crisis in Ukraine and the collapse of positive relations with Russia. James Bergeron explores where NATO has been on its twenty-five-year journey through the post-Cold War era and surveys the strategic challenges that the Alliance now confronts.
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| 2 |
ID:
132082
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's annexation of Crimea and its actions in eastern Ukraine have led to a fundamental shift in Europe's security environment. Jonathan Eyal argues that NATO will have to find a way to reassure its Eastern European members without repudiating existing structures for co-operation with Russia.
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| 3 |
ID:
077574
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The senior U.S. State Department intelligence analyst for Europe argues that, during and after the NATO leaders meeting in Riga in November, how they and their successors manage the frictions generated by NATO-EU competition will determine the future of the transatlantic alliance
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| 4 |
ID:
132094
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the NATO summit in Wales approaches, the US debate about the country's international strategy becomes more and more relevant, particularly in the light of recent developments in Eastern Europe and discussions about the role of the Atlantic Alliance post Afghanistan. Don Thieme explores some of the most pressing issues dominating this debate and suggests six reasons why the US needs to remain engaged in a renewed NATO.
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| 5 |
ID:
061501
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| 6 |
ID:
059032
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To repair the damaged transatlantic alliance, the second Bush administration must rediscover the values of Republican internationalism. Fortunately, the recent enlargement of NATO and the EU gives Washington a great chance to buttress the allies' economic ties, security strategy, and foreign policy.
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| 7 |
ID:
079565
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| 8 |
ID:
174606
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| Summary/Abstract |
NATO has successfully adjusted itself in the political and security environment of the post-Cold war era through enlargement, focusing on conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping. Currently, the most important challenge to NATO comes from within. Under businessman-turned-U.S. President Donald J. Trump who focuses his attention on ‘making America great again’, the issue of burden sharing has dominated NATO’s agenda. President Trump has pressured European countries to increase their defense spending to meet the 2% of GDP defense spending objective of NATO. While the previous U.S. presidents also pressured European states with regard to burden sharing, President Trump’s rhetoric differs from his predecessors by associating American commitment to the Alliance directly to the defense spending of NATO’s European members. Importantly, this article shows that despite Trump’s skepticism of NATO and his rhetorical pressure on its member states regarding the issue of burden sharing, there is no change in the American approach to NATO at the policy level.
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| 9 |
ID:
063232
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| 10 |
ID:
129211
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A quarter century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, relations between the United States and Europe have evolved from a single-minded focus on stabilizing the European continent into more diffuse security, economic, and diplomatic agendas encompassing three broad elements. The first is ensuring the continued
vitality of the transatlantic alliance while taming the turbulent spaces of wider Europe. The second is guaranteeing mutual economic recovery while harnessing deep integration to create jobs and fuel growth, and also repositioning Europe and the United States for a world of emerging economies. The third is addressing a range of regional and global challenges, from energy security and nonproliferation to Middle Eastern turmoil and uncertain Asian dynamics.
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| 11 |
ID:
075259
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
America need not restore the bygone, comprehensive relationship with Europe to achieve its purposes.
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| 12 |
ID:
059134
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| Publication |
2004.
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| Description |
p103-120
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| 13 |
ID:
142067
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores whether the United States has been able to exert transatlantic leadership since its head-on diplomatic collision with several European capitals over the 2003 Iraq war. Considering that the decision to invade Iraq was made by the Bush administration, this article also explores whether there has been consistency between the Bush and Obama administrations over transatlantic leadership. To answer these questions, this article reports on a computer-assisted content analysis of the 415 official statements issued by the core transatlantic allies, namely the United States, France, and Britain, in response to four major crises that have occurred in the Middle East and North Africa in the post-Iraq era. This analysis provides qualitative and quantitative evidence leading to four main conclusions. Firstly, US leadership has endured in the post-Iraq era. Secondly, in most cases, France and Britain have aligned their diplomatic positions with those of the United States. Thirdly, the analysis confirms that there is a special Anglo-American relationship. Fourthly and lastly, there has been consistency between the Bush and Obama administrations, with the exception of the US response to the Libyan crisis, which suggests the emergence of a US ‘leading from behind’ transatlantic strategy.
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