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| 1 |
ID:
099707
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the late 1950s, as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) replaced bombers, the development of Soviet ICBMs prompted fears of strategic vulnerability in the West. The Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on the territory of NATO allies sought to redress the perceived vulnerability until American ICBMs were ready. British deception planners considered how to enhance the threat posed by the IRBMs. An outline plan codenamed 'Celestial' was intended to persuade the Soviets that the otherwise vulnerable missiles could not be readily neutralised. This article explores this deception and how such planning also sought to convey accurate information alongside disinformation. It also suggests that deception planners appear to have given little heed to the potentially counterproductive consequences of such an operation.
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| 2 |
ID:
083328
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2008.
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| Description |
xvii, 332p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415349987
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053839 | 327.12/HUG 053839 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
117431
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role of American intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis is crucial to understand perceptions and judgements of key actors in October 1962. Dino Brugioni's Eyeball to Eyeball provides a detailed 'insider's' account that combines memoir and history. It focuses on the role of aerial intelligence, which was vital to how the crisis was managed in Washington. Brugioni's account also provides a representation of events that explores both military/operational aspects and political decision-making in Washington, most importantly that of President John F. Kennedy. Brugioni argues that it was a victory for Kennedy and for America. Twenty years of scholarship and revelation has challenged this conclusion, which this article examines. Likewise, the idea that the crisis marked a notable success for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is revisited in the light of new information and assessments.
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| 4 |
ID:
108722
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2011.
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The study of the Cold War has undergone a significant transformation in recent years, with new critical perspectives, sources and debates. The nuclear history of the Cold War has begun to yield new insights on fundamental questions about the stability and dynamics of the confrontation. Recent evidence about the events of 1983 provides an opportunity to explore the risk of nuclear war and the role of misperception in Soviet-American relations during the 'Second Cold War'. Central to this is the study of intelligence. This article examines episodes in the autumn of 1983, notably the Able Archer 'crisis' of November 1983. Attention focuses on aspects of Soviet, American and British intelligence. Political and diplomatic consequences are also considered. A principal aim is to emphasize that we are at an early stage in researching and understanding events, and that a number of assumptions about the crisis require further exploration. Broader lessons about the role of intelligence in the Cold War are nevertheless explored and provisional conclusions reached about the performances of intelligence agencies and communities.
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| 5 |
ID:
087531
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article outlines and explores some recent changes that have taken place in the practice and organization of western intelligence. American concern with organizational reform of its intelligence community is outlined and contrasted. Other transatlantic comparisons are made, in particular concerning debates about intelligence and human rights. The legacy of British experience in Northern Ireland for attitudes to torture and preservation of the rule of law is examined. The British experience of 'talking to terrorists' is also explored. Prospects for, and expectations of, the future, including the likelihood of catastrophic terrorism are discussed. The argument is made that the 'War on Terror' is a 'battle of ideas' and values.
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| 6 |
ID:
080263
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2008.
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| Description |
xii, 268p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415400510
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053023 | 327.12/SCO 053023 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
072173
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| 8 |
ID:
173965
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Many western historians believe that in November 1983 the world went to the brink of nuclear war. Paranoid Soviet leaders, it is argued, feared that an annual NATO exercise to rehearse nuclear release procedures, Able Archer 83, was being used to disguise preparations for an American nuclear first-strike. As a consequence, Soviet nuclear forces prepared to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack that would have precipitated Armageddon. In their very different books, Nate Jones and Taylor Downing explore the contexts and risks of what Robert Gates has called, ‘one of the potentially most dangerous episodes of the Cold War’.
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| 9 |
ID:
059127
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| 10 |
ID:
117426
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| Publication |
2012.
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The Cuban missile crisis remains one of the most intensely studied events of the twentieth century, and which engages the attention of scholars from a variety of disciplines. Lessons learned by American practitioners and academics contributed to the conduct of American foreign policy in the 1960s and to academic understanding of nuclear deterrence, nuclear crises and crisis management in general. Nearly 50 fifty years of scholarship have generated new insights and understanding. From the 1980s, study of what in Moscow was termed the Caribbean crisis was informed by access to Soviet officials and Soviet archives, and became the forefront of the 'new historiography' of the Cold War. This collection reviews how various texts inform our understanding and how new interpretations and/or new sources of information have overtaken (or indeed validated) the original analysis. This article provides an overview of this endeavour and an answer to the question of whether we should continue to study the Cuban missile crisis.
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| 11 |
ID:
079218
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2007.
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Since September 2001, jihadist attacks on the West and the war on Iraq have focused public attention on intelligence and invigorated academic interest in intelligence studies. Once neglected in academia, the subject is now increasingly firmly established in British and American universities. Common interest in understanding the value as well as the limitations of intelligence nevertheless disguises differing epistemological foundations. Until the late 1980s official British attitudes to secrecy, including opposition to any form of public accountability, inhibited and distorted public understanding. The last two decades have seen changing attitudes to both archival disclosure and parliamentary accountability, though the significance of these is contested. This article outlines these changes as well as how various authors have used various sources to represent the secret world. Two specific areas are explored: covert action and the joint intelligence machinery. The former presents particularly interesting challenges to academic and public scrutiny (in some contrast to the United States) while the latter has received unprecedented illumination in the wake of the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. While opportunities for understanding British intelligence remained constrained they are nevertheless more propitious than they have ever been
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| 12 |
ID:
059117
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