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| 1 |
ID:
131049
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given the contemporary political situation and the interlocking concerns with effecting control over crime and terrorism, and the way in which intelligence-oriented logics are being proposed as a key component of the toolkit for such tasks [u]nderstanding the epistemological and ontological basis of intelligence work is an important undertaking. 1
Intelligence inquiry has previously been conducted mainly in the domain of national security, clandestine operations, and military activities. In the last two decades, intelligence has branched out in domains other than those traditionally and strictly related to national security, such as criminal intelligence within policing. The increased emphasis on intelligence and intelligence-led investigations is evident in existing policing strategies, especially when policing organized and serious crime. 2 An underlying assumption in this tendency is that intelligence contributes to the rationalization of crime control, and will enable informed decisions, ensure police efficiency, and meet the "need for an objective, decision-making framework.
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| 2 |
ID:
131106
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The emphasis and visibility afforded analytic tradecraft in the Intelligence Community's analytic production has fluctuated throughout its existence. The explanation for this intermittent emphasis on tradecraft may lie in changes in consumer preferences and collection means, the role played by individual tradecraft advocates, and the lack of an intelligence failure matching the severity of 9/11 and the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Both failures served as a forceful reminder that while strong analytic tradecraft does not guarantee 'getting a judgment right', it increases the likelihood that the assessments produced are transparent, relevant, and rigorous.
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| 3 |
ID:
127712
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although intelligence postmortems are a common practice in the aftermath of intelligence failure, little is known about how they are conducted. This article explores the methodology employed by Robert Jervis in intelligence postmortems that followed the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the formulation of the 2002 Iraq national intelligence estimate that warned of the possibility that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. The analysis reveals the challenges faced by scholars as they attempt to assess why analysts failed to offer accurate estimates and the way contemporary international relations theory can be applied to the realm of policy. The findings of the postmortems also shed light on areas where additional collaboration among scholars and analysts can advance the art of intelligence analysis.
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| 4 |
ID:
130235
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Within the context of intelligence, the assassination of Egypt's President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat on 6 October 1981 can be characterized as both a symbolic security failure and a failure to implement professional security principles by those responsible for guarding his life.
The circumstances creating the security "hole" were not confined to the short period preceding the assassination, but rather began long before, as part of an intense clash between two conflicting forces: extreme Islam and modern statehood.
In contrast to prevailing opinion, the apex of the struggle between these two forces is the main reason for the assassination, and not Sadat's peace with Israel. 1 The assassins of the al-Jihad group, springing unchecked from the substratum of fundamentalist Islam, carried out their work resolutely, exploiting the circumstances with almost incredible ease.
The sixth of October, observed in Egypt as a day of military triumph over the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the October 1973 War (the Yom Kippur War), is celebrated as an official holiday at the Grave of the Unknown Soldier on the outskirts of Cairo. On that date in 1981, on the reviewing stand stood President Sadat and his entourage: Vice President Hosni Mubarak; Defense Minister Mohammad Abu-Gazala; members of parliament; and members of the diplomatic corps, among them Israeli Ambassador Moshe Sassón.
Mirage fighter planes flew in celebratory formation above, and all in attendance were occupied with watching them and the huge parade passing before the reviewing stand, as columns of soldiers marched past the proud president.
When it was the artillery unit's turn to pass, a military truck stopped suddenly, from which four uniformed men sprang. Thinking this was part of the pageantry, no security personnel acted to prevent them from approaching the reviewing stand. One of the men quickly threw a grenade that did not explode, followed by more grenades. The assassins cocked their weapons and charged, firing at those on the reviewing stand.
The speed and suddenness with which the assassination was carried out resulted in pandemonium. People ran in all directions to take cover while Sadat stood, stiff and in shock, making him a clear target for sniper Hussein Abbas, 2 who shot him in the neck and chest. Sadat collapsed on the spot, yet this did not prevent another assassin, Abed al-Hamid, from emptying the rest of his rifle's magazine unhindered to confirm the kill. Sadat was flown by Gazelle helicopter to the Armed Forces Military Hospital at Ma'adi, but he arrived with no pulse, as his chest and arteries had been fatally penetrated.
The individual responsible for the assassination was Captain Khalid al-Islambouli. The fact that he and his partners managed to carry out this "inside job," despite explicit warnings having been received of threats on the president's life at the parade, testifies to a complete absence of common sense on the part of the Egyptian security sector.
The head of the Israeli security unit and lead investigator of the assassination, who was also responsible for Ambassador Sasson's rescue, was Avraham Rotem. According to Rotem, some members of Sadat's security detail were known to Rotem's unit personally due to previous reciprocal visits between Israeli and Egyptian personnel. 3 For this reason, the part played by Egyptian security personnel that day remains a mystery, due precisely to Israel's familiarity with them and the fact that they had acquired their security expertise from the best American instructional training. Sadat's assassination therefore raises a number of burning questions emanating from the fact that many in the upper Egyptian echelons knew that Sadat was in the opposition's crosshairs.
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| 5 |
ID:
072558
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| 6 |
ID:
104410
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| 7 |
ID:
037744
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| Publication |
London, Macmillan Company, 1969.
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| Description |
xiv, 303p.Hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 004112 | 940.5485/KIR 004112 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
090710
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Uri Bar-Joseph and Jack S. Levy look at the different ways in which the conscious distortion of information and the politicization of intelligence can lead to intelligence failure. They apply their categories to the Soviet failure to anticipate the German attack in 1941 and to the Israeli failure to anticipate the Arab attack in 1973.
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| 9 |
ID:
178635
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This article offers strategic observations about the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. It assesses whether the disease outbreak represents an intelligence failure. It describes how the global response to COVID-19 is an example of the so-called “spiral model” in action, whereby policy deliberations are overtaken by events. The analysis also assess how recent experience casts new light on assumptions common to the literature on biological weapons. It addresses the possibility that COVID-19 could spark a rise in cosmopolitan attitudes globally and offers reservations about using the COVID-19 experience as a future template for global pandemic response.
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| 10 |
ID:
171250
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| 11 |
ID:
082832
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2008.
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John A. Gentry discusses the nature of U.S. intelligence "failures." He argues that excessive expectations for the performance of intelligence agencies mean that many charges of intelligence failure are misplaced and many reform proposals are misdirected. He concludes that policymakers and policy-implementing agencies often cause intelligence-related failures
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| 12 |
ID:
163954
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| Summary/Abstract |
The military's top officers may not be interested in failure, but failure is interested in them.
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| 13 |
ID:
096347
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| 14 |
ID:
090430
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kargil war was a limited war; the first of its kind after the Indo-Pak nuclear weapons tests and the Lahore Declaration. It has now become a more likely operational norm in the strategic environment where large scale capture of terrotories, forced change of regimes, and extensive military damage on the adversary are ruled out politically. It was not the first when Pakistan initiated a war; and we must no assume that it would be the last time.
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| 15 |
ID:
086803
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of Defense (DoD) has made significant improvements in protecting its service members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attacks on installations. The attack on USS Cole (DDG 67), in the port of Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000, demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces.
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| 16 |
ID:
118623
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| 17 |
ID:
142390
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| 18 |
ID:
104499
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| 19 |
ID:
149694
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Paris and Brussles attacks and the Orlando nightclub shooting demonstrated the vulnerability of crowds in enclosed spaces. Anthony Brooks and Shaun Romeril analyse the evolution of event security technique, learning from the London 2012 Olympics.
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| 20 |
ID:
090431
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kargil Review Committtee (KRC) was not an investigation into what happened at kargil, but a review of the developments and recommendations as to the measures to be undertaken to prevent suc an occurences in the future. The report highlighted that it was a major failure and several recommendations were made to rectify the lacunae.
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