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ID:
016547
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| Publication |
Sept 1993.
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| Description |
410-414
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| 2 |
ID:
059209
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| 3 |
ID:
094217
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The following article will analyse the global and geopolitical dimensions of the future international energy security and its implications for Europe and the EU-27. In this context, I will discuss to which extent the EU's newly proclaimed "Energy Action Plan" of the EU Spring summit of 2007 and its declared common energy (foreign) policy are a sufficient strategy to cope with the new global and geopolitical challenges. The article concludes the following: (1) The interlinkage between globally designed traditional energy security concepts - that rely just on economic factors and "market-strategies" - and domestic as well as regional political stability demands new thinking with regard to both energy supply security and foreign and security policies. (2) Although after the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in January 2006, energy security has forced its way up the European energy and foreign policy agendas, the EU-27 member states have largely failed to forge a coherent European energy security and energy foreign policy strategy after their Spring summit of 2007 because its declared political solidarity has been still lacking. But the 2nd Strategic Energy Review of November 2008 has recommended new initiatives to overcome this lack by promoting concrete infrastructure and other projects for enhancing Europe's supply security and its political solidarity as part of a common energy (foreign) policy. If the EU is able to implement the March 2007 and November 2008 decisions, the EU oil and gas demand will drastically reduce and freeze at current levels. In this case, Putin's energy policies by using Russia's energy resources and pipeline monopolies as a political instrument to enforce its economic and geopolitical interests will be proved as self-defeating in Russia's long-term strategic interests. It will reduce Gazprom's gas exports to a much smaller EU gas market than originally forecasted as the result of a deliberate EU policy of decreasing its overall gas demand and by diversifying its gas imports.
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| 4 |
ID:
123597
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The development of unconventional gas exploration in the USA, in particular shale gas, caused a revolution in the American and the global gas markets. The regional-wide use of unconventional gas resources could stabilise the natural gas demand and the energy supply security of European and Asian countries. But traditionally, almost all gas contracts in Europe and Asia are linked to oil because of the demand for stable, long-term contracts. Furthermore, in many Asian countries, large state-owned enterprises dominate their national gas markets, leading to little competition and incentives to reduce gas prices. In Europe, the expansion of unconventional gas is facing grassroots opposition from environmental groups who are concerned about ground water safety, adequate waste water management, seismic events and greenhouse gas emissions. This article examines the rapidly changing natural gas markets and the role and prospects of unconventional gas as well as the impacts it may have on European and Asian energy security. It highlights, in particular, the geo-economic and geo-political implications and discusses whether the US unconventional gas revolution can be duplicated in Europe and Asia.
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