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| 1 |
ID:
104896
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The global rise of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its potentially devastating consequences require a comprehensive regulatory framework for reducing emissions, including those from the transport sector. Alternative fuels and technologies have been promoted as a means for reducing the carbon intensity of the transport sector. However, the overall transport policy framework in major world economies is geared towards the use of conventional fossil fuels. This paper evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of current climate policies for road transport that (1) target fuel producers and/or car manufacturers, and (2) influence use of alternative fuels and technologies. With diversifying fuel supply chains, carbon intensity of fuels and energy efficiency of vehicles cannot be regulated by a single instrument. We demonstrate that vehicles are best regulated across all fuels in terms of energy per distance. We conclude that price-based policies and a cap on total emissions are essential for alleviating rebound effects and perverse incentives of fuel efficiency standards and low carbon fuel standards. In tandem with existing policy tools, cap and price signal policies incentivize all emissions reduction options. Design and effects of cap and trade in the transport sector are investigated in the companion article (Flachsland et al., in this issue).
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| 2 |
ID:
103342
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Current policies in the road transport sector fail to deliver consistent and efficient incentives for greenhouse gas abatement (see companion article by Creutzig et al., in press). Market-based instruments such as cap-and-trade systems close this policy gap and complement traditional policies that are required where specific market failures arise. Even in presence of strong existing non-market policies, cap-and-trade delivers additional abatement and efficiency by incentivizing demand side abatement options. This paper analyzes generic design options and economic impacts of including the European road transport sector into the EU ETS. Suitable points of regulation are up- and midstream in the fuel chain to ensure effectiveness (cover all emissions and avoid double-counting), efficiency (incentivize all abatement options) and low transaction costs. Based on year 2020 marginal abatement cost curves from different models and current EU climate policy objectives we show that in contrast to conventional wisdom, road transport inclusion would not change the EU ETS allowance price. Hence, industrial carbon leakage induced by adding road transport to the EU ETS may be less important than previously estimated.
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| 3 |
ID:
115117
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Carbon dioxide emissions correspond to fossil resource use. When considering this supply side of climate protection, crucial questions come to fore. It seems likely that owners of fossil resources would object to emission reductions. Moreover, policy instruments such as taxes may not be effective at all: it seems individually rational to leave no fossil resources unused. In this context, it can be expected that economic sectors will react strategically to climate policy, aiming at a re-distribution of rents.
To address these questions, we investigate the effectiveness, efficiency, and resource rents for energy taxes, resource taxes, and quantity rationing of emissions. The analysis is based on a game theoretic growth model with explicit factor markets and policy instruments. Market equilibrium depends on a government that acts as a Stackelberg leader with a climate protection goal. We find that resource taxes and quantity rationing achieve this objective efficiently, energy taxation is only second-best. The use of quantity rationing to achieve climate protection generates substantial rents for resource owners.
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| 4 |
ID:
098588
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the debate on post-Kyoto global climate policy, intensity targets, which set a maximum amount of emissions per GDP, figure as prominent alternative to Kyoto-style absolute emission targets, especially for developing countries. This paper re-examines the case for intensity targets by critically assessing several of its properties, namely (i) reduction of cost-uncertainty, (ii) reduction of 'hot air', (iii) compatibility with international emissions trading, (iv) incentive to decouple carbon emissions and economic output (decarbonization), and, (v) use as a substitute for banking/borrowing. Relying on simple analytical models, it is shown that the effect on cost-uncertainty is ambiguous and depends on parameter values, and that the same holds for the risk of 'hot air'; that the intensity target distorts international emissions trading; that despite potential asymmetries in the choice of abatement technology between absolute and intensity target, the incentive for a lasting transformation of the energy system is not necessarily stronger under the latter; and, finally, that only a well-working intensity target could substitute banking/borrowing to some extent-but also vice versa. Overall, the results suggest that due to the increased complexity and the potentially only modest benefits of an intensity target, absolute targets remain a robust choice for a cautious policy maker.
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| 5 |
ID:
059210
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| 6 |
ID:
109635
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The impacts of the availability of low-carbon technologies on the regional distribution of mitigation costs are analyzed in a global multi-regional integrated assessment model. Three effects on regional consumption losses are distinguished: domestic measures, trade of fossil energy carriers and trade of emission permits. Key results are: (i) GDP losses and a redirection of investments in the energy system towards capital-intensive technologies are major contributions to regional consumption losses. (ii) A devaluation of tradable fossil energy endowments contributes largely to the mitigation costs of fossil fuel exporters. (iii) In case of reduced availability of low-carbon technologies, the permit market volume and associated monetary redistributions increase. The results suggest that the availability of a broad portfolio of low-carbon technologies could facilitate negotiations on the permit allocation scheme in a global cap-and-trade system.
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| 7 |
ID:
103356
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The "green paradox" by Hans-Werner Sinn suggests that increasing resource taxes accelerate global warming because resource owners increase near-term extraction in fear of higher future taxation. In this note we show that this effect does only occur for the specific set of carbon taxes that increase at a rate higher than the effective discount rate of the resource owners. We calculate a critical initial value for the carbon tax that leads to a decreased cumulative consumption over the entire (infinite) time horizon. Applying our formal findings to carbon taxes for several mitigation targets, we conclude that there is a low risk of a green paradox in case the regulator implements and commits to a permanently mal-adjusted tax. This remaining risk can be avoided by emissions trading scheme as suggested by Sinn-as long as the emission caps are set appropriately and the intertemporal permit market works correctly.
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