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| 1 |
ID:
078965
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This concluding article returns to some of the key themes of this volume in relation to insurgency, counter-insurgency and collapsing states. In particular it attempts to characterise the relationship between the Long War and the Cold War, in relation to the transformation of the nation-state system. More broadly it emphasises that the Cold War was an often misdirected, militarised struggle between 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism and 'genuinely existing' state socialism (the First World and the Second World) against each other and for influence and power in the erstwhile Third World. The Long War, meanwhile, reflects both the triumph of 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism as the dominant form of secular modernity over an equally, if not more virulently secular 'genuinely existing' state-socialism, and the emergence of an anti-secular neo-traditionalism (often, but not exclusively, Islamic) at both the nation-state and the transnational level. At the same time the binary that drove the Cold War and led to considerable bloodshed, was often characterised by contradictions within the two main ostensible challengers which were as potent as those between them. This is also the case in relation to Islamic revivalisms and their neo-traditional challenges to secular modernity and 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism. (In fact, it is worth noting, that although Islamic fundamentalisms are at the forefront of the neo-traditional revival, there are other religious-based neo-traditionalisms seeking to counter the global spread of 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism.) We conclude that the 'real' Long War may be a struggle within the 'Muslim world' rather than the ostensible struggle between the 'West' and 'Islam'
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| 2 |
ID:
108254
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Some postmortems of the Bush Administration's pre-Iraq war decision-making have focused on a dysfunctional National Security Council (NSC) structure as the major reason for the lack of a thorough strategic assessment prior to the March 2003 invasion. Other academic and journalistic accounts have focused on a lack of a first rate conceptual thinker at the top levels of the Bush Administration as an important cause of the strategic shortcomings in Iraq decision-making. This article will assess the relative impact of decision-making structure versus quality of strategic leadership in explaining poor performance in the first five years of the Iraq war.
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| 3 |
ID:
138622
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IF STRATEGY is the art of rethinking the possible, then the time for strategic innovation against what the U.S. military terms violent extremist organizations (VEOs) is now. The American-led air war in Iraq and Syria may have shown some progress against the Islamic State and other VEOs, but the VEOs and their sympathizers have hit back with attacks in France and brutal beheadings of journalists and aid workers. Frustration is growing in Congress as the traditional tools of American power fail to produce decisive results. But what can those on Capitol Hill do?
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| 4 |
ID:
085937
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past 30 years rapid advances in the realm of digital technology and the establishment of an ever expanding globally networked communications infrastructure have radically altered the infrastructure of the global economy. Combined with new rules for international finance, the de-regulation of capital and labour markets and the embracing of a 'free trade' ethos by most states in the international system, today's 'information age' bears little resemblance to the economic world experienced by previous generations. Rapid economic changes have been accompanied by the broad dissemination of social, cultural and political information to all corners of the globe, a phenomenon that has contributed to a number of important socio-political developments. Using social movement theory to frame our analytical narrative, we investigate how the demands and pressures of globalisation have helped to foment 'Balik Islam', a religious-based social movement concentrated among the ranks of returned overseas Filipino workers in the northern island of Luzon. These workers, having converted from Catholicism to Islam while employed in the Middle East, are beginning to reshape the political fabric of the Republic of the Philippines, sometimes in a violent fashion. To illustrate the possible extremes of Balik Islam, the article will chart the rise and fall of the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a Balik-Islam group that was responsible for a number of recent terrorist attacks, and whose members, thanks to their ability to blend in with the dominant population, pose a special challenge to democracy.
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| 5 |
ID:
079739
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2007.
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| Description |
xv, 248p.
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| Series |
Contemporary security studies
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| Standard Number |
9780415771245
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 052867 | 355.343/ARQ 052867 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
078952
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This introductory article provides the context for the contemporary debate about insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states taking place against the backdrop of what originated as the 'global war on terror' (gwot) and is now increasingly being characterised as 'the Long War'. The Long War and the gwot are often represented as a 'new' era in warfare and US geopolitics, despite the fact that, rhetorically, George W Bush and other administration officials have on occasion invoked the Second World War as analogous to the Long War. This article argues that the Long War is new in important respects, but it also bears many similarities to the Cold War. A key similarity between the Cold War and the Long War is the way in which insurgency and counterinsurgency are seen primarily in the context of inter-state rivalry in which the critical local or regional dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution are neglected. In this context US policy makers and their allies have again erroneously applied a 'grand strategy' that suits the imperatives of conventional military and geopolitical thinking rather than engaging with what is a much more variegated array of problems facing the changing global order. The Long War is ostensibly a war against various non-state movements, networks and actors, and is even represented as such by the Pentagon and the White House. However, the overall approach to the Long War has continued to fall back on the conventional 'American Way of War' that produces more problems than it solves.
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| 7 |
ID:
134057
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the 'intelligence-policy nexus' are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a 'failure of intelligence' by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).
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| 8 |
ID:
076698
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| 9 |
ID:
001593
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 1997.
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| Description |
xx, 308p.
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| Standard Number |
0415161673
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041187 | 320.95/BER 041187 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
075680
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| 11 |
ID:
000628
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1999.
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| Description |
xxiii, 261p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0714648515
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041996 | 959.7043373/BOR 041996 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
059372
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Winter 2004-05.
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