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ID:
103825
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| Publication |
London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011.
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| Description |
340p.
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| Standard Number |
9781408817001
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055947 | 327.1747/ELB 055947 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
076710
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Good intelligence is critical to support U.S. policy efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, but the historical record is mixed. This article reviews several past cases of nonproliferation success and failure, including the Soviet Union, China, India, Libya, Iraq, and the A. Q. Khan network. Intelligence frequently provides warning, and in some cases concrete and timely information has enabled nonproliferation successes. On the other hand, failures often result from a lack of detailed and specific information adequate to overturn erroneous assumptions or preconceptions. Improvements in intelligence are needed, but correct assessments of foreign programs cannot be guaranteed. A close and healthy relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers is also a key factor in making the most of insights that are developed.
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| 3 |
ID:
103094
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| 4 |
ID:
094511
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| 5 |
ID:
115300
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses a geographic approach to examine one aspect of the nuclear black market: the coordinators who bring buyers and sellers together, and transport goods between them. The most important factor in determining the geographical structure of a proliferation network is the network coordinator's access (or lack thereof) to unique state resources. Coordinators with access to state resources and prerogatives can avoid embedding themselves in hostile countries or relying on commercial infrastructure, often leading to territorially diffuse logistical networks. Coordinators without such access are forced to rely on commercial infrastructure and favorable local political, economic, and social conditions, often resulting in territorially centralized logistical networks. This is illustrated through case studies of Abdul Qadeer Khan's supply networks to Pakistan, Libya, and Iran. The article concludes with some observations about the implications of a geographical approach for understanding nuclear proliferation networks.
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| 6 |
ID:
123437
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is possible that Iran has covertly acquired a very small number of nuclear weapons and that these have been tested by North Korea. There are an increasing number of reports to this effect going back to 2007 when the London Daily Telegraph reported that with North Korean help Iran could obtain a "low-grade device-less than half a kiloton-within 12 months." According to The New York Times concerning the 2013 North Korean nuclear test, a senior Obama administration official concluded that "it's very possible that the North Koreans are testing for two countries." A.Q. Kahn proliferated detailed technical information not only on the original Chinese CHIC-4 nuclear weapons design but also on a smaller version of the design tested by Pakistan in 1998. If Iran has covertly acquired nuclear weapons, they are likely to be very few in number and low yield. There may still be time to prevent the development by Iran of an extensive nuclear weapons capability but the continuation of the current ineffective diplomacy will not do it.
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| 7 |
ID:
131605
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence is a critical component for all counter-proliferation activities. It allows us to assess and determine what makes up the current threat environment in terms of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. When informed with an accurate assessment of the situation, policy-makers are better suited to counter the proliferation threat. However, success and failure hinge upon how well information is managed during the intelligence process. The intelligence process as it relates to estimating nuclear capabilities or intentions is wrought with many challenges and complications. The denial and deception techniques employed by states running covert weapons programs and the dual-use nature of many weapons components create many difficulties for intelligence organizations. Additionally, illicit transnational networks obscure the situation further by serving as a source, for both nation states and non-state actors, for acquiring dual-use commodities and technologies. These challenges can lead to the miscalculation of a state's capabilities or intentions, as witnessed with the case of Iraq in 2003 when western intelligence services grossly overestimated the capabilities of Saddam's regime. This paper presents a comparative analysis of three cases of nuclear proliferation: India's 1998 nuclear tests, the exposure of the A. Q. Khan network and Iran's nuclear program. Drawing from the analysis, the authors examine the lessons learned and propose recommendations for future counter proliferation policy and strategy.
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| 8 |
ID:
102331
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| 9 |
ID:
103707
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| Publication |
2011.
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Richard Weitz looks at the international politics of nuclear forensics-a scientific technique that employs various investigatory methods to reveal the source and history of nuclear material. He worries that many governments and analysts underestimate the difficulties in constructing an effective nuclear forensics regime that can pinpoint those responsible for a nuclear incident and thus weakens the ability to deter by threatening nuclear retaliation.
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| 10 |
ID:
137585
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| 11 |
ID:
123829
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| 12 |
ID:
106110
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| 13 |
ID:
109055
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| 14 |
ID:
104386
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| 15 |
ID:
156012
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