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| 1 |
ID:
105109
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| 2 |
ID:
161379
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| Publication |
California, Stanford University Press, 2018.
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| Description |
xii, 304p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781503604858
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059528 | 327.1/YUS 059528 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
126907
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| 4 |
ID:
119558
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| 5 |
ID:
092934
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper documents and analyses 46 proposals made between 1947 and 2008 for resolving the India-Pakistan dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. We conduct a content analysis to recognise the patterns that emerge from these formulations and identify the key elements that recur over time. Our analysis suggests that the dispute may be more 'ripe' for resolution today than it has ever been in the past. For the first time in the dispute's history, there is growing convergence over a core element of the solution, ie granting autonomy to Kashmiris. This is matched by a virtual consensus on the 'catalysts', namely soft borders to allow relatively free human and economic exchange within Jammu and Kashmir, the notion of Kashmiri involvement in any negotiations on the issue and demilitarisation of the state. Ripeness alone, however, does not lead to resolution. Over the years various dynamic proposals have been made, which means that this particular convergence could also dissipate, as some of the prior ones have. There is a potential window of opportunity today, but it will not last indefinitely.
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| 6 |
ID:
146813
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| Contents |
Since declaring their nuclear weapons capabilities in 1998, India and Pakistan have engaged in three major crises that each threatened to escalate into war. In each crisis, the USA engaged in active diplomacy to dissuade the South Asian rivals from taking escalatory actions. Previous literature on the crises has described the American role, but has not theorized third-party involvement in a nuclearized regional rivalry. We apply Timothy Crawford’s pivotal deterrence theory to the nuclearized India–Pakistan conflict, and extend the original theory to cover the novel condition of a non-superpower nuclear dyad, in the context of a single-superpower international system. We find that America’s pivotal deterrence generally enhanced stability in the India–Pakistan crises, and unlike in pre-nuclear South Asia, other great powers supported American diplomacy. However, we suggest that future regional crises between nuclear rivals, in South Asia or elsewhere, may present greater challenges for pivotal deterrence.
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| 7 |
ID:
082862
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| 8 |
ID:
059731
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| Publication |
Jan-Mar 2005.
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| 9 |
ID:
094457
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| 10 |
ID:
090786
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay analyses the US drone strikes in Pakistan both from a strategic and tactical perspective. The legal and purely ethical aspects of the subject are not examined. Instead, the paper takes a nuanced position on whether the US drone attacks should continue in Pakistan. It argues that in this bigger picture, the employment of the drones points to fundamental strategic weakness in the overall US-Pakistan effort rather than a failure of the drones per se.
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