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| 1 |
ID:
059789
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| 2 |
ID:
085758
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| Summary/Abstract |
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, who enjoys more
domestic power and higher international
name recognition than any other president
of a Latin American democracy, is now facing serious
political troubles. Since mid-2007, the Chávez
administration has been beset by street protests,
electoral setbacks, and economic woes that amount
to a second wave of discontent.
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| 3 |
ID:
067161
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| 4 |
ID:
176803
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| Summary/Abstract |
In its first generation, the literature on the resource curse typically posited that resource dependence shapes a country's economy and politics. More recent work posits that the effects are mediated by institutions. We take this newer approach further by arguing that economic and political institutions not just mediate but actually shape resource dependence. Our focus is on performance across national oil companies (NOCs) in Latin America. We explain performance variation by invoking variations in regime and market features. NOCs that operate in contexts of greater independence from the Executive Branch (stronger checks and balances within and outside the sector) and greater market forces—though not necessarily private actor dominance—exhibit better performance. Institutions thus influence sector conditions, rather than the other way around. We advance this argument using original data from Colombia and Venezuela, and supplementary data from Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Our study focuses on the oil boom-bust cycle of 2003–2016.
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| 5 |
ID:
143811
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| 6 |
ID:
090952
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has achieved what no other Latin American leader has since the end of the Cold War: bringing security concerns in the Western Hemisphere back to U.S. foreign policy. Might Venezuela provoke a war against neighboring Colombia, spread weapons among insurgents abroad, disrupt oil sales to the United States, provide financial support to Hezbollah, al Qaeda or other fundamentalist movements, offer safe havens for drug dealers, invite Russia to open a military base on its territory, or even acquire nuclear weapons?1 These security concerns did not exist less than a decade ago, but today they occupy the attention of U.S. officials. Attention to these conventional security issues, however, carries the risk of ignoring what thus far has been Venezuela's most effective foreign policy tool in challenging the United States: the use of generous handouts abroad, peppered with a pro-poor, distribution-prone discourse. While the U.S. debate revolves around "hard power" and "soft power,"2 this other form can be called "social power diplomacy."
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| 7 |
ID:
118275
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the opposition to win, the regime must become fairer and more democratic, the ruling party must split, and the opposition must remain united.
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