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| 1 |
ID:
119254
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Changes in how we think about nuclear weapons cannot strip them of their strategic value. Only a transformation of the nature of international politics or the emergence of an alternative means of strategic deterrence can do that. The structural realist analysis that I present argues that there are two basic constraints on the role that nuclear weapons play in international politics. The first constraint stems from the anarchic and competitive nature of the international system, which leads to insecurity and encourages states to acquire the most effective weapons possible as part of their quest for security. The second constraint stems from the material characteristics of nuclear weapons; these characteristics, most notably their destructive power, mean that nuclear weapons can serve as, but are also limited to the role of, a strategic deterrent. Together, these constraints mean that nuclear weapons will continue to be valued as a strategic deterrent. Any devaluing that occurs in the foreseeable future will be limited and will not extend to 'deep devaluing' and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Two common counter-arguments - lessons from chemical and biological disarmament, and the imperative from disarmament thought to stem from nuclear proliferation - do not challenge this conclusion. The key question we face is not how to devalue and eliminate nuclear weapons, but what sort of nuclear world maintains sufficient deterrence while minimizing the possibility of nuclear use.
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| 2 |
ID:
163253
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| Summary/Abstract |
With chemical weapons (CW) use in Syria raising questions about the health of the CW norm, this article analyzes whether the Syrian case will lead to further proliferation and use of chemical weapons by states. We examine the use of chemical weapons at Ghouta in 2013 and on the Hama Plains in 2014 and find that: first, chemical weapons have demonstrated limited military utility in Syria, either tactically or as a tool of civilian victimization; second, the costs of use have been repeatedly demonstrated by the international reaction to their use; and third, the use of sarin—a nerve agent—has attracted a stronger international response than the use of chlorine, a less lethal agent. Consequently, we conclude that the Syrian case is unlikely to lead to significant proliferation and use of chemical weapons; any that does occur is most likely to involve states already outside the CW norm.
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| 3 |
ID:
146232
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role of norms and military utility in the use of weapons is disputed by constructivist and realist scholars. Through an examination of US decision-making regarding anti-plant and irritant agents in the Vietnam War, I advance this debate in three key ways. First, I develop structural realism’s expectations regarding the role of military utility. Second, I demonstrate that social and material factors are at play in our understandings of both ‘norms’ and ‘military utility’, and that both played a role in US decisions. Third, I find that the dominant role – as structural realism expects – was played by military utility.
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| 4 |
ID:
021666
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| Publication |
March 2002.
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| Description |
63-98
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