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1 |
ID:
149821
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Summary/Abstract |
Insurgent movements have proliferated in ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and beyond. Jonathan Spyer examines the ways in which these groups tactics are changing to accommodate the semi-conventional role that they are increasingly playing.
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2 |
ID:
131048
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
One of the most uncomfortable questions that stare in the face of Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) is whether an IPS officer with a career-long experience in state police force can lead a central paramilitary force. Even within the central paramilitary forces, the tasks and objectives of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the border guarding forces are different. Furthermore, among the border guarding forces, Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) functions differently than the Border Security Force (BSF) or the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) or Myanmar Border for that matter. So, shouldn't ACC consider the experience of the officer with a particular force before appointing him to its top position?
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3 |
ID:
131042
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
If the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) were to be believed, the paramilitary forces fighting the internal security battle - especially in the Red Corridor - were provided with the best equipment. The paramilitary personnel, however, think otherwise. Either it is inadequate number of weapons and systems, or inefficient training; till now the paramilitary forces have not been able to handle the security situation in the Naxal stronghold areas. Latest in the long list of disappointments were the incidents of Naxal attacks during the General Elections.
On April 12, Bastar and Bijapur districts in Chhattisgarh witnessed Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) blasts during the voting season. Maoists triggered landmines in these two areas which claimed the lives of seven polling officials and five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. Three days later, another blast was carried out which killed three security forces. On May 11, seven cops were killed in yet another landmine blast in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
When asked for MHA's assessment on these security lapses, a highly placed official in the ministry said that the paramilitary personnel were in the 'election mode', and as a result security vacuum was created. He implied that it was not physically possible to ensure full safety in this so-called 'election mode'. He then tossed over the responsibility and blame on to the director generals (DG) of the paramilitary forces. "The top leadership of the paramilitary forces could have done better by ensuring proper training to their troops," he said. Giving the example of mini-training centres, which were the brain-child of the then DG CRPF Vijay Kumar, the MHA official said that the DGs did not take this idea forward. Apparently, lack of coordinated efforts between the top officials led to the lack of training.
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4 |
ID:
060165
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Publication |
United States, Oxford University Press, 2002.
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Description |
116p.
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Series |
Adelphi paper; 352
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Standard Number |
0198527071
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
046000 | 355.0218/MAC 046000 | Main | On Shelf | Map | |
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5 |
ID:
128668
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6 |
ID:
184816
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7 |
ID:
073136
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Publication |
New York, Columbia Univeristy Press, 2006.
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Description |
316p.
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Standard Number |
0231129823
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
051495 | 355.0218/SHU 051495 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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8 |
ID:
074465
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9 |
ID:
137881
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Summary/Abstract |
There is an old saying that one should do a good deed by one’s right hand in such a manner that even the left hand doesn’t get to know. The philosophy behind this saying is that charity remains an offering as long as one doesn’t talk about it, else it becomes propaganda
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10 |
ID:
159188
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Summary/Abstract |
At the core of waging war and strategy is the creation, control and use of force. This article investigates the volunteer battalions that mobilized in Ukraine during the spring of 2014. It contextualizes the volunteer phenomenon and focuses on the state strategies to establish control over these militias. As ambiguous entities arising from a situation characterized by rapid social change – revolution and war – the volunteer battalions threatened existing hierarchies and questioned state authority. The situation was exacerbated by the war, which deviated from the expectations of Ukrainian combatants and Western military observers alike. The state nevertheless enjoyed a modicum of success in reining in the militias through four strategies of undermining, co-option, incorporation and coercion. While predominantly integrated into a more rigid category of paramilitary forces, the volunteers continue to play a role in both the Ukrainian society and security sector to the unforeseeable future.
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11 |
ID:
184829
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12 |
ID:
126007
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Another eventful year is coming to an end and this time there is a lot to be cheerful about. For the defence and the paramilitary forces, the year 2013 has been fruitful in terms of their force modernisation. Even the defence industry managed to find satisfaction in some of the advances made in the long and tedious defence procurement.
On the other hand, instances of infiltration, cross border firing and border incursion from neighbouring armies cast a pall of gloom in an otherwise successful year. In addition, there were tragic and extremely challenging situations which the government and the forces faced, such as the devastating floods in Uttarakhand, INS Sindhurakshak mishap and so on. But overall, it has been an eventful year. Let's look at the major events in Indian defence in 2013.
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