| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
060178
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| Publication |
Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2004.
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| Description |
xii, 171p.
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| Series |
NATO science series
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| Standard Number |
1586034537
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049417 | 355.0335/REA 049417 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
096917
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the pivotal, but largely neglected 1977-1978 German neutron bomb (ERW) controversy in its broader domestic and international contexts. It explains how a domestic ideological intra-Social Democratic Party (SPD) argument over "security" and "Germany" between chancellor Schmidt and SPD executive party secretary Bahr turned a secret governmental issue-the question of ERW production and deployment-into a highly politicised public debate. Internationally the ERW affair revealed a deep Euro-Atlantic rift and rapidly worsening East-West relations which could threaten the "German" situation. On the domestic scene Bahr used the opportunity to stimulate moralist-pacifist thinking within his party and among the wider public by which he not only risked association with Soviet peace diplomacy, but also challenged Schmidt's political authority and strained the government coalition beyond repair. Above all, however, it provided the political context for Schmidt to embrace an international leadership role by verbalising his initial ideas of what in 1979 would become NATO's landmark "dual-track decision."
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| 3 |
ID:
075736
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on newly released documents from the German foreign ministry archives, this article investigates Bonn's goals, strategies and negotiation tactics at the Conference on Security and Development in Europe (CSCE). By focusing in particular on the multilateral preparatory talks in 1972/73 when the general Conference framework was negotiated and national and alliance positions were determined, it will be shown that (1) the Federal Republic of Germany was the key Western player at the CSCE, and (2) its policies were largely driven by national, Deutschlandpolitik interests - although on the surface the emphasis was always on a multilateral approach and a united Western (EPC/NATO) position. Furthermore, this article will reveal the significance of the 'politics of language' in West German diplomacy; and offer some wider reflections on the importance of language and its symbolism in international relations.
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