| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
018641
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| Publication |
Winter 2001.
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| Description |
45-80
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| 2 |
ID:
088477
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The membership of Turkey is one of the most controversial external relations issues of the European Union (EU). In a comparison of four instances of decision-making on accession negotiations with Turkey between 1997 and 2006, this paper explains why and under which conditions Turkey has progressed on the way to EU membership in spite of persistent and increasing divergence of membership preferences. In line with the entrapment hypothesis of normative institutionalism, the analysis shows that Turkey and its supporters within the EU have been able to overcome the opposition to its membership bid to the extent that Turkey followed the fundamental norms of the EU.
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| 3 |
ID:
095278
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This introductory essay reviews the literature on historical legacies in the post-communist area and relates it to the study of enlargement and Europeanisation. The authors develop a framework for the special section, specify various ways in which historical legacies can be conceived of affecting conditionality and compliance, give an overview of the contributions and summarise the findings.
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| 4 |
ID:
064955
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| Publication |
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2005.
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| Description |
x, 256p.
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| Standard Number |
080148916X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049928 | 337.1420943/SCH 049928 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
095279
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Previous studies have established strong and robust effects of EU political conditionality on democracy in the neighbouring countries. We test these effects against the claim that historical legacies condition the likelihood of successful democratisation-and possibly the EU's political conditionality as well. Based on a panel study of 36 countries of the Eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU between 1988 and 2004, we show that cultural legacies of religious civilisation are indeed conducive to or inhibit democratisation, and reduce the effects of political conditionality, but they do not explain away the EU's role in promoting democratic consolidation.
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| 6 |
ID:
088481
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Normative Institutionalism has proven to be a robust theory of EU decision-making on foreign policy and external relations whose entrapment and cooperative bargaining explanations for the policy-making process and outcome are generally (though not universally) superior to those of competing theories. This conclusion emerges from 14 case studies across a broad range of policy areas and institutional settings, all of which exhibited clear differences in the initial policy preferences of member states. Only two of the cases offered clear support for Intergovernmentalism's competitive bargaining hypothesis, while none of the case studies conforms to either the normative suasion or policy learning hypotheses, which posit distinctive mechanisms of policy agreement based on preference convergence. Cross-case analysis identifies the relative importance of five conditions hypothesized to affect the likelihood of entrapment and cooperative bargaining: determinacy, relevance, publicity, precedent and forum. Finally, we discuss the implications of this special issue for future research and for EU policy-making
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| 7 |
ID:
081925
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| Publication |
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
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| Description |
xi, 243p.
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| Standard Number |
9780230019478
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053561 | 320.072/GSC 053561 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
066869
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