| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
154816
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The years following the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 have generally been seen as a period of neglect in US non-proliferation policy. While joining recent scholarship questioning this, the article also shows that the policies that emerged from the Nixon–Ford years were the product of a broad range of factors that constrained both the United States’ ability and willingness to build an effective non-proliferation regime. These included the Nixon administration’s initial skepticism regarding the NPT, as well as the global dispersion of power away from the US, combined with the continued importance of anti-Soviet containment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
027953
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, Thames and Hudson, 1961.
|
| Description |
199p.hbk
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 013214 | 960/CAM 013214 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
188620
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The United States and the Soviet Union concluded two sets of strategic arms limitation talks – SALT I and II – during the 1970s. Drawing on recent revisionist scholarship, this analysis assesses the success of SALT I and SALT II’s relative failure and I by framing Soviet-American strategic arms control in the 1970s as an exercise in co-operative competition, the pursuit of competitive strategies through nominally co-operative means. Whilst SALT I achieved a temporary balance between the co-operative and competitive elements of arms control, SALT II’s demise was in large part due to the fundamental contradictions at the heart of both superpowers’ use of strategic arms limitation as an instrument of co-operative competition. The analysis concludes by assessing the implications of this analysis for strategic arms control in a new era of great-power rivalry.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
172898
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|