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ID: 092868

Industrial policy in the United States: a neo-polanyian interpretation / Schrank, Andrew; Whitford, Josh

Schrank, Andrew	Journal Article
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2009.

Summary/Abstract

The conventional wisdom holds that U.S. political institutions are inhospitable to industrial policy. The authors call the conventional wisdom into question by making four claims: (1) the activities targeted by industrial policy are increasingly governed by decentralized production networks rather than markets or hierarchies, (2) "network failures" are therefore no less threatening to industrial dynamism than market or organizational failures, (3) the spatial and organizational decentralization of production have simultaneously increased the demand and broadened the support for American industrial policy, and (4) political decentralization is therefore likely to improve the functioning of industrial policies designed to combat network

Key Words

Federalism ; Industrial policy ; Governance ; Networks ; Polanyi

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ID: 060420

Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case / Shadlen, Kenneth C.; Schrank, Andrew; Kurtz, Marcus J.

Mar 2005

Shadlen, Kenneth C.	Journal Article
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Publication

Mar 2005.

Summary/Abstract

end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States-particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions-lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.

Key Words

WTO ; IPRs ; Intellecual Property Rights

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