Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
015168
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Publication |
Jun 1991.
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Description |
241-271
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2 |
ID:
005024
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Publication |
London, Brassey's, 1994.
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Description |
xvi, 320p.
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Standard Number |
1857530691
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
036123 | 358/MAS 036123 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
064402
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4 |
ID:
016077
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Publication |
June 1993.
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Description |
10-14
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5 |
ID:
014388
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Publication |
Summer 1992.
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Description |
41-54
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6 |
ID:
064166
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7 |
ID:
130239
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
Almost every war that America has fought since the beginning of the twentieth century was a war America had determined to avoid. We were neutral in World War I?.?.?.?until unlimited submarine warfare against our trans-Atlantic shipping became intolerable. We resisted entering World War II until Pearl Harbor. We defined the Korean peninsula as lying outside our "defense perimeter," as our secretary of state declared in 1950, a few months before North Korea attacked South Korea and we leapt into the fray. A few years later, we rebuffed French appeals for support in Vietnam in order to avoid involving ourselves in that distant country which was soon to become the venue of our longest war and greatest defeat. In 1990, our ambassador to Iraq explained to Saddam Hussein that Washington had "no opinion on?.?.?.?your border disagreement with Kuwait," which he took as encouragement to swallow his small neighbor, forcing a half million Americans to travel around the world to force him to disgorge it. A year after that, our secretary of state quipped about the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia that "we have no dog in that fight," a sentiment echoed by his successor, of the opposite party, who, demonstrating his virtuosity at geography, observed that that country was "a long way from home" in a place where we lacked "vital interests"-all this not long before we sent our air force to bomb Serbia into ceasing its attacks on Bosnia and then bombed it again a few years later until it coughed up Kosovo.
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8 |
ID:
130241
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
I had never been a big fan of American exceptionalism. It was too self-referential, self-identifying, self-focused for my personal comfort. Then one bitterly cold day in February 1994, I was wandering through the open-air market in Sarajevo. The market had been hit by a single mortar round the previous weekend and sixty-eight people had been killed. Holes made by fragments from the 120-mm shell were still visible in the asphalt.
As I stared at the gouged surface in my battle dress and parka, Sarajevans began to come up to me, point to the small American flag on my upper sleeve, give a hesitant thumbs-up gesture, and whisper, almost prayerfully, "USA, USA."
Edward Snowden's leaks have fixated the media and the public on privacy and espionage, but the larger and more complex debate on protecting American security in the 21st century has been wanting.
At that point it became clear to me that it mattered less whether I thought America was exceptional. What mattered was that many people around the world thought that we were, and expected us to act accordingly. In many ways this is less something we have earned or even want, and more the product of historical circumstance. But a burden has clearly been ours, and when it is no longer ours the best judgment we can hope for is something along the lines of "As global hegemons go, these guys weren't bad." Now, under President Obama, the United States is involved in a redefinition or at least a recalibration of that exceptional role.
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9 |
ID:
128738
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Since I now live in the Gulf, it was a happy coincidence that found me in Portsmouth on 16th July 2013 and therefore able to attend the Centenary Party; and what a splendid affairs it was. I must have taken much work to prepare and I'm sure members will join me in thanking everyone involved.
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10 |
ID:
013644
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Publication |
July 1992.
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Description |
341-61
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11 |
ID:
050389
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12 |
ID:
015160
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Publication |
Jun1991.
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Description |
321-335
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13 |
ID:
005830
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Publication |
New York, United Nations, 1995.
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Description |
xvi,287p.
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Standard Number |
9290451033
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Copies: C:3/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
037307 | R 338.926/LOD 037307 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
037308 | R 338.926/LOD 037308 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
D37308 | R 338.926/LOD D37308 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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14 |
ID:
061863
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15 |
ID:
128999
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Iranian military intervention in Oman (1972-75) proved to be one of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's most successful foreign policy initiatives. He entered at the request of Sultan Qabus to help quell the Marxist rebellion of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in Dhufar province. The shah took this action without any prior consultation with either Britain or the United States, acting for reasons wholly related to Iran's regional security. In so doing, he angered most of his Arab neighbors, who protested vigorously. He persisted. His troops tipped the balance in favor of the sultan's forces, contributing to a speedy end to the insurrection, for which Iran earned the lasting gratitude of the sultan.
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16 |
ID:
095515
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17 |
ID:
143757
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Summary/Abstract |
Lessons for the intelligence community were publicly identified in a 1983 report by Lord Franks and a 2004 report by Lord Butler. However, little is known of the lessons learned during the 20 years between the two. This article draws upon two newly released, previously classified, documents which examine British intelligence lessons from the 1990–91 Gulf War. It provides a previously untold account of the crisis, exclusively from a British intelligence perspective, and presents new evidence that intersects across many intelligence debates. This article also challenges whether identified lessons remained learned and begins to question the wider learning process within the intelligence community.
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18 |
ID:
013821
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Publication |
April 1992.
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Description |
30-43
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19 |
ID:
064163
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20 |
ID:
016371
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Publication |
Aug 1993.
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Description |
171-195
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