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ID:
000946
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| Publication |
Indiana, Hudson Institute, 1995.
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| Description |
xx, 290p.
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| Standard Number |
1558130500
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 038872 | 327.47/ODO 038872 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
082827
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is 'strategic' or 'national' intelligence and 'tactical' intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature
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| 3 |
ID:
002835
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| Publication |
Miami, Graduate School of International Studies, 1987.
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| Description |
11p.
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| Series |
Institute for Soviet and East European Studies; Occasional paper series; vol.II, no.2
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 034154 | 320.9581/ODO 034154 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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