| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
024871
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1976.
|
| Description |
xvii, 493p.hbk
|
| Series |
SIPRI Yearbook 1976
|
| Standard Number |
0262191490
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 015630 | 327.17405/SIP 015630 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
005450
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
New York, Plenum Press, 1995.
|
| Description |
xix, 309p.
|
| Series |
Issues in international security
|
| Standard Number |
0306450061
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036707 | 355.825119/PIL 036707 | Main | Withdrawn | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
009219
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
May 1995.
|
| Description |
19-21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
010052
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
1995.
|
| Description |
15-29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
005123
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Geneva, UNIDIR, 1995.
|
| Description |
91p.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:3/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036307 | 341.734/UNI 036307 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 036308 | 341.734/UNI 036308 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 036309 | 341.734/UNI 036309 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
009634
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Dec 1995.
|
| Description |
421-428
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
010050
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
1995.
|
| Description |
1-14
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
008857
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
1995.
|
| Description |
1-53
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
146754
|
|
|
|
|
| Contents |
The 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the culmination of a decades-long debate on the legality of nuclear weapons. In recent years, it has shaped how international law is invoked by the initiative focused on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons use and served as a foundation for the nuclear disarmament cases brought by the Marshall Islands in the court.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
011718
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Dec 1996.
|
| Description |
327-346
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
019792
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
May 2001.
|
| Description |
51-62
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
066727
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
061423
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
068709
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
059719
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Jan-Feb 2005.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
094124
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
098799
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ended on 28 May with a consensus final document. A further deepening of the non-proliferation regime's crisis was thus avoided. The more cooperative policy of the Obama administration was one of the main reasons for this partial success which was assisted by the pragmatic negotiation posture of some moderate non-aligned states. However, the result is a compromise at the level of the lowest common denominator: the parties did not agree on bold steps towards nuclear disarmament, nor did they strengthen the toolbox for non-proliferation. In the end, the most outstanding result was the plan for a conference on ways and means to foster a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 18 |
ID:
167949
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this paper is to assess the strategic environment of the Republic
of Korea (ROK) and to examine what strategies the ROK will develop ahead of
the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear arms control policy-making is very
complex for the ROK because of its specific security dilemma. And the role and
strategy of the ROK in international regimes are increasingly important for the
ROK’s security and status in the world. Thus, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and its review process including the Review Conference and
Preparatory Committee are particularly essential to the ROK. In 2020 when the
10th Review Conference will be held, the ROK should present an appropriate
strategy. For this, this article first outlines the establishment and development of the
NPT and its review process from 1995 to 2015, after the Cold War and the North
Korean nuclear issue was raised. And it describes the ROK’s role played in the
NPT on the basis of its three pillars and suggests what strategies Korea must retain:
Nuclear disarmament and security assurances from Russia and China; Coercing the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to rejoin the NPT; Continuing the
momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit; and Setting and leading a new agenda.
This study concludes with a forecast that the year 2020 will be a major turning point
for Korea.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 19 |
ID:
093563
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons has often seemed unrealistic, if not utopian. The Cold War posed intractable apocalyptic dangers, and the post-Cold War "peace dividend" proved scant. But over the decades, nuclear arms control and nonproliferation successes have been as important as the setbacks, and in 2010 the abolition aspiration has made something of a comeback. This article surveys the most important challenges facing nuclear disarmament progress today. The article considers the interrelationships among the positions of the key categories of states shaping the contemporary global nuclear order, for good or ill, as a capstone to the other pieces in this special section, which focus on those categories individually. The article concludes that progress toward disarmament will not be easy or fast. Weaning states off their reliance on threats to either use or acquire nuclear arms requires progress in improving the conditions of global governance more generally. But the goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons is a realistic prospect and, consequently, an essential imperative.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 20 |
ID:
101078
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China has been a nuclear weapon power since October 1964 and India and Pakistan openly since May 1998. Each had its own reason to acquire nuclear weapons-Pakistan to counter India, India to counter both Pakistan and China, and Beijing has always viewed the U.S. and for some time the former Soviet Union as possible nuclear threats. Within Asia, no meaningful dialogue has ever been carried out between China, India and Pakistan on nuclear issues: either on confidence building, doctrine and safety, or on each other's perception of the nuclear threat. Even necessary risk reduction measures have not been attempted. However, some Track Two level dialogues have taken place and this has contributed to some understanding of nuclear policies, strategies and doctrines. In this backdrop, the present study examines the doctrine, strategy and command, and control arrangements prevailing in these countries and recommends the necessary confidence-building measures. These include greater transparency on doctrine, clearer examination of likely strategy and means to universalize "no first use."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|