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| 1 |
ID:
061236
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| 2 |
ID:
083126
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
use the nuclear proliferation regime to show that dyadic diplomacy is not necessarily incompatible with the building of a multilateral regime; bilateralism is not the opposite of multilateralism, but an efficient component thereof. Although this point will not be new to most students of institutions, no general rationale has so far been offered on the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Starting from a characterization of proliferation as the result of a large number of prisoner's dilemmas played out between states engaged in local dyadic rivalries, I demonstrate that it is possible for the superpowers to design an optimal mix of threats and bribes in which states with low compliance costs join the regime on the terms of the multilateral treaty alone; states with intermediate compliance costs need additional customized incentives, delivered through bilateral agreements; and states with high compliance costs are not only left out of the regime but also punished for nonparticipation. I draw a few comparative statics that I systematically test on Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) membership data. I discuss the applicability of the model to the currency, trade, and aid regimes.
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| 3 |
ID:
130995
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Different international regimes are built from legal instruments that vary in terms of whether they are multilateral, bilateral, or a combination thereof. We investigate the reasons for such variation. The choice between multilateralism and bilateralism is a function of the tradeoff between each instrument's relative flaw. Multilateralism is wasteful in incentives, as the same agreement is offered to all states regardless of their compliance costs. Bilateralism mitigates this problem by allowing for more tailored agreements but in the process multiplies transaction costs by requiring many of them. We use a formal model to generate propositions on the design of "lateralism" and the related issue of membership size and offer illustrations in the context of four regimes: foreign direct investment, human rights, climate change, and international trade.
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