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| 1 |
ID:
069593
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2002.
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| Description |
xxxii, 73p.
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| Standard Number |
83303135x
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045603 | 355.033573/MCG 045603 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
071059
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2001.
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| Description |
29p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044210 | 355.03/GOM 044210 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
061298
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2005.
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| Description |
xi, 55p.
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| Standard Number |
0833036769
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 049606 | 327.51073/GOM 049606 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
146429
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| Summary/Abstract |
America’s emergence as a leading producer and prospective major exporter of liquid hydrocarbons – petroleum and liquefied natural gas (LNG) – presents it with historic opportunities: negating OPEC’s ability to control world prices; thwarting Russian manipulation of natural-gas supplies for political ends; reducing global dependence on the volatile Middle East and vulnerable Persian Gulf; and giving US allies in Europe and East Asia an alternative to insecure supplies. A further opportunity looms for the United States to supply energy to China, and in doing so to realise economic gains, help China reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and lend stability to the world’s most critical relationship. China, too, has much to gain.
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| 5 |
ID:
138792
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When it comes to cyber war, the United States is ambivalent. While persuaded of the utility of offensive cyber operations, it dreads where they might lead. The advantages of cyber war are swamped by the disadvantages if it cannot be kept under control – and there are nagging doubts about whether it can. That computer systems are often interconnected and ultipurpose,
and that there are no sharp ‘firebreaks’ in cyber war, compounds the dangers of escalation to unintended levels and effects, including the disruption of critical civilian services. In a crisis or war, the United States might, despite misgivings, feel compelled to attack computer systems that enable the enemy to strike US forces, only to find itself engaged in cycles of attack and retaliation that produce more pain than gain.
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| 6 |
ID:
167296
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The United States must take the lead in reconfiguring nuclear deterrence to withstand cyber war.
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| 7 |
ID:
132463
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China and the US both recognise that an armed conflict between them would include cyber warfare. But there is a curious and risky failure to connect the tactical military advantages of cyber attacks with the strategic hazards.
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| 8 |
ID:
065563
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| 9 |
ID:
068445
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| 10 |
ID:
183789
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| Summary/Abstract |
Policymakers need a broad and durable framework for clearly assessing the challenges posed by China, setting priorities for dealing with them and developing effective and consistent responses and initiatives. This article offers a framework derived from Chinese leaders’ long-standing quest for control. It consists of four concentric circles, from China’s domestic order in the centre, where its pursuit of control is strongest, to its conception of an alternative to the US-led liberal international order in the outermost circle, where it is weakest. The second circle encompasses lands and waters that the Chinese consider unambiguously theirs, especially Taiwan and the South China Sea. The third is the Asia-Pacific region writ large, where China means to replace the United States as the leading power. Because these two circles encompass important, if not vital, US interests and obligations, yet are fixed in China’s geopolitical agenda, the potential for conflict within them is especially high.
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| 11 |
ID:
120484
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The North Korean state may survive for years or may go peacefully. But a violent end, however unlikely, would be very bad indeed. Washington must look beyond the immediate crisis and prepare for the worst.
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| 12 |
ID:
042684
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| Publication |
New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977.
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| Description |
xii, 370p.
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| Standard Number |
007023714X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 017557 | 341.734/GOM 017557 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
069432
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2002.
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| Description |
xiv, 69p.
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| Standard Number |
0833032097
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045933 | 355.0310973094/GOM 045933 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
176519
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| Summary/Abstract |
Now that China is all-in for technological competition, both the presumption of American primacy and the proper roles of US government and industry are open to debate.
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| 15 |
ID:
053033
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004.
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| Description |
xi, 38p.
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| Contents |
Occasional paper
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048391 | 355.4/GOM 048391 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 16 |
ID:
177916
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| Summary/Abstract |
A quantum internet could provide more effective security against private cyber crime, Russian cyber war and Chinese efforts to gain information dominance.
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| 17 |
ID:
188799
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the rising risk of complex crises and military escalation in the Pacific region, the United States should invite China into a process of nuclear restraint and confidence-building, which we call ‘nuclear stewardship’. This process could start with a joint bilateral declaration that neither superpower would use nuclear weapons first against the other or its formal allies. This would acknowledge that neither side could gain by striking first with a nuclear device. This declaration could be the leading edge of a broader set of discussions on strategic stability and eventual implementation of confidence-building measures designed to enhance mutual understanding and trust in the US–Chinese nuclear relationship.
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| 18 |
ID:
141126
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| Summary/Abstract |
‘War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it,’ said William Tecumseh Sherman.1 As we have previously argued in this journal, cyber war is war.2 Whether it is cruel and unrefined depends on the manner in which it is waged.3 While this is not solely up to the United States, US policy can have big effects. Yet, if US policy on offensive cyber war is influential, it is also inchoate. While some vagueness about when and how the United States would conduct offensive cyber operations is necessary, its general policy on this matter warrants debate. This article is meant to inform such a debate.
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