| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
114203
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| 2 |
ID:
059535
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| Publication |
London, Brassey's, 1990.
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| Description |
xvi, 432p.
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| Standard Number |
0080367062
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 031401 | 327.14/CHA 031401 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
119414
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Early in the Northern Ireland conflict the army took the lead in intelligence operations, including Humint. This article examines the case of 'Observer B', an agent run jointly with MI5. Using testimony and documents provided to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry as well as original archival sources, it offers a unique Humint case study that discusses the agent's recruitment, motivation, reliability, handling, product, and utility. This represents the most complete account that we have of this case, but gaps remain. It illustrates some of the limitations of clandestine Humint collection in situations where information may be time-sensitive. The article challenges the conventional wisdom about army/MI5 relations and shows how the two improvised and cooperated in agent-running.
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| 4 |
ID:
049069
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 1996.
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| Description |
228p.
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| Standard Number |
0714642495
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039046 | 327.12/CHA 039046 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
005006
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| Publication |
University of New Brunswick, 1994.
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| Description |
viii, 220p.
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| Standard Number |
0969821506
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036112 | 341.584/CHA 036112 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
164188
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains the origins of the British Army’s covert counter-insurgency intelligence efforts in Northern Ireland, and shows how the army professionalized its approach to clandestine intelligence collection there. It traces the pre-1969 precedents for covert collection. It also shows that the early ad hoc efforts proved insufficient and problematic; some collection operations were exposed and compromised. Thus, the army decided to ‘professionalize’ the clandestine collection of intelligence, and created a special body–the Special Reconnaissance Unit–to handle the task. This laid the foundations for later intelligence successes and for current army intelligence doctrine.
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| 7 |
ID:
076657
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