| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
037760
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| Publication |
London, WeidenFeld and Nicolson, 1966.
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| Description |
xiii, 1164p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 001073 | 358.24/KAH 001073 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
092979
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two newly available sources for World War II intelligence history consist of French pre-war mainly intelligence documents held for years in the Soviet Union and recently returned to France and of German pre-war documents, primarily cryptologic, held for years in the United Kingdom and recently restituted to the Federal Republic. In addition, a memorandum of 1930 reveals that the future spy Hans-Thilo Schmidt frequently visited the factory making the Enigma machine and coolly asked the manufacturer for basic details, which they gave him and which he later sold to the French, leading eventually to the Allied reading of Engima-enciphered messages during World War II.
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| 3 |
ID:
100742
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1945, the British and American chiefs of staff ordered that information about the Allied solution of German cryptosystems be excluded from their official histories of World War II in order to preserve an intelligence advantage. This left the world with an incomplete but not an erroneous account of that struggle. Despite a few leaks, not until Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham revealed those solutions in 1974 did that story begin to emerge fully. An unexpected consequence was to bolster British pride.
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| 4 |
ID:
073516
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Modern militaries' obsession with intelligence gathering and evaluation would have bemused Caesar and Napoleon, since such behavior was rarely engaged in until recently. In the war on terrorism, intelligence is playing its greatest role yet, but even today, espionage and intelligence analysis will not be the decisive factors.
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