Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
096324
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2 |
ID:
061654
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Publication |
London, Hutchinson & company, 1966.
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Description |
400p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
001960 | 358.0941/DIV 001960 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
091210
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
It is this article's contention that such a heavy emphasis on STOVL technologies and operational concepts does raise a number of perplexing questions, and it is hardly justifiable in operational terms. Rather there are reasons to suspect that the real rationale for this keen interest towards the F-35B is eminently political, and it has to do with the air forces desire to maintain their traditional role as the main, and ideally only, purveyors of air power in our age of expeditionary conflicts.
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4 |
ID:
092101
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
In 2002 I found myself back in uniform after a series of phone calls which started with Are you available to command a Forward Logistics Site (FLS) ashore in the Middle East?
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5 |
ID:
091144
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The evolution of weaponry is directly linked to the history of violence, peace and conflict. The history of violence, peace and conflict is also a history of a series of ever-more-efficient devices to enable humans to kill and dominate their fellow human beings.
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6 |
ID:
048726
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Publication |
London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1995.
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Description |
xxii, 366p.Hbk
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Series |
Cass series: studies in air power
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Standard Number |
0714646172
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
039084 | 940.544941/GOU 039084 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
156494
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8 |
ID:
085054
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9 |
ID:
122505
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10 |
ID:
131920
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11 |
ID:
146623
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Summary/Abstract |
Why do countries have air forces? Organizational alternatives, such as maintaining separate air arms for the army and navy, have become quite rare. The conventional narrative advanced by advocates of independent air forces stress that the primacy of airpower in modern warfare mandates centralized control of most military aviation. In this view, political–military uncertainty has driven mimetic isomorphism – pressure on national governments to organize as others organize so as to fight or deter war just as effectively. However, working from a set of 56 countries that were politically independent within a few years of the establishment of the first ever independent air force (the Royal Air Force) in 1918, and continuing through nearly the present, there is no clear pattern of external military pressure prompting this particular reorganization. Rather, from anecdotal evidence, the cause has more likely been normative isomorphism – a professional craving to look as others look to foster political or personal legitimacy. For whatever reason, though, choices of structures tend to lead to specific choices of policies. Thus, the result suggests that defense ministries looking for more effective or less costly organizational schemas may reasonably consider alternatives to the tripartite army–navy–air force structure.
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12 |
ID:
137888
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Summary/Abstract |
Air power is not just a country’s air force or the air arms of all its armed forces put together. Air power of a nation, as defined in the Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force (IAF) is “the total ability of a nation to assert its will through the medium of air. It includes both civil and military aviation, existing and potential.” An understanding and assimilation of this basic fact, and planning and putting in place a system to harness the extraordinary airlift capability of civil aviation, is germane to acquiring true air mobility and lift in times of need – both in peace and in war.
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13 |
ID:
127112
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14 |
ID:
131939
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15 |
ID:
121442
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Geopolitics has a tradition of adopting a downward looking view-from-above, which is imbued with an imperialistic 'god's eye' perspective. Although acknowledged and critiqued, this paper argues that it needs to be actively re-orientated to encompass the discourses and practices of looking up. The paper analyses the practices of looking up and surveilling the sky through which air defence is achieved. It interrogates the ways in which UK air defence is represented in official documents and analyses the activities of the Royal Air Force's Air Surveillance and Control System. The paper argues that this system enacts a vertical geopolitics that goes beyond those understood in other geopolitical literatures and offers suggestions for developing our understandings of a volumetric vertical geopolitics that recognises the aerial view as generated from below as well as from above.
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16 |
ID:
130726
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The winter of 2011 was a dramatic period for air power in Mediterranean Europe and India. Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the successful North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offensive aerial campaign that paved the way for a regime change in Libya, involved two platforms that had been shortlisted for the largest fighter aircraft deal of recent times. In the race for the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF), both the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale-platforms that were well exploited during the Libyan campaign-had been shortlisted over the much fancied US fighters, the F-18 and the F-16. Taking note of the highly professional conduct of the IAF during the flight trials, both the UK and France attempted to woo the IAF by showcasing the capabilities of the aircraft and other enabling platforms against the backdrop of their successful employment in diverse roles during OUP from March to October 2011. Numerous presentations were made at various seminars in New Delhi by Royal Air Force (RAF) and French Air Force (FAF) operational commanders who had taken part in the campaign, both at operational and tactical levels.
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17 |
ID:
034518
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Publication |
London, Cassell Ltd., 1979.
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Description |
xiv, 349p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
0-304-30042-X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
018706 | 940.544942/DEA 018706 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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18 |
ID:
169388
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Summary/Abstract |
The official historians of the British strategic air offensive described RAF Bomber Command’s development in the spring and summer of 1944 as an operational “revolution.” The present article explores aspects of that development in closer and critical detail, highlighting the organizational change employed to make operational experiments into standard operating procedure, the role of airborne control at the target (the master bomber), and related challenges in signals communication. It also examines closely some of the bombing data compiled and analyzed by the command’s Operational Research Section. The article concludes that the “revolution” produced change sufficient to make the command a more effective bomber force, but a variety of factors limited further progress in the operational environment of 1944–45.
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19 |
ID:
131946
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20 |
ID:
127391
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