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| 1 |
ID:
163776
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| 2 |
ID:
135302
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea were two major international events in which Russia engaged in early 2014. In spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning each of them, four concepts strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics and in appropriating Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the scenarios for both Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of strengthening Russia as a political community through mechanisms of domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition to unfriendly external forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled two different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving – albeit by different means – Russia’s great power status. Fourth, one of the major drivers of Russian policy in both cases were security concerns in Russia’s southern flanks, though domestic security was also an important part of the agenda.
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| 3 |
ID:
124081
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2013.
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An important recent development in the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been the growing interest in the national schools and "non-core" theorizing. Even though this interest is fully justified, we argue that the tendency to describe all such schools as invariably promising and helpful in overcoming the Eurocentrism of the discipline is misguided. It originates in the false assumption that the infinite diversity of collective experiences throughout the world can only be approached on the basis of epistemological pluralism. We explore the confusion between the ontological and epistemological aspects of the problem by looking at the state of international studies in Russia. The development of Russian IR is defined by a controversy between pro-Western transitological approaches and the dominant relativist position centered around the doctrine of multipolarity. The latter is translated into the epistemological domain, leading to a totally counterproductive assertion that "Western" science is unable to understand Russia's specificity.
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| 4 |
ID:
107436
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines the main approaches to multilateralism that coexist nn Russian foreign policy thinking. It argues that these approaches must be put in the context of the debate on multipolarity, which comes out as a direct opposition to the Western "collective unilateralism." Both as an abstract model and as a concrete practice, multipolarity is not synonymous with multilateralism; certain visions of a multipolar world, such as great-power management, are hardly compatible with multilateralism if the latter is grounded in the idea of equality of all participants in the international system. It is also crucial to take in to account the origins of the Russian doctrine of multipolarity in the particular context of Russia's uneasy relationship with the West. Against this background, it is clear that some traditional foreign policy strategies, such as balance of power, can result in both unilateralist and multilateralist outcomes. The article's main conclusion is that the contradictory dynamics of identity and security, in Russia and in the West, seem to produce a trend in favor of great-power management as the model of future international order. If this is true, it means that there is a move toward a type of international society where egalitarian multilateralism is replaced by a more hierarchical structure.
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| 5 |
ID:
160897
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contours of regionalism in a wider Europe are shaped by two dominant actors, the European Union (EU) and Russia, which often have divergent visions of the regional landscapes in a vast area constituting their common neighbourhood. The EU can be characterised as the promoter of normative regionalism, while Russia generates different forms of civilisational regionalism. Russia’s emphasis on the civilisational underpinnings of its regional integration model paves the way for two different strategies: one based on liberal imitation and replication of EU experiences in order to strengthen Russia’s position in the global neoliberal economy, and another grounded in illiberal contestation of the normative premises of the EU with the purpose of devising an ideologised alternative to the liberal West.
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| 6 |
ID:
061881
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| 7 |
ID:
163789
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This article uses approaches embedded in practical and popular geopolitics for analysing how Russia capitalizes on the refugee crisis to redefine Europe. Two of Russia’s European policies are at the centre of this analysis: 1) Moscow’s direct appeal to Russian-speaking communities, and 2) the Kremlin’s liaisons with Eurosceptic parties of national conservative background. The main questions these two policies raise are: 1) how Russia benefits from anti-refugee attitudes among European national conservative groups, and 2) how illustrative Russia’s policies are of Moscow’s strategy toward Europe in the context of the refugee crisis. The article argues that, for Russia, these two policies constitute a strategy of re-entry into Europe from which Moscow was increasingly isolated in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this context, the authors claim that the refugee crisis has widened room for Russia’s return to the European (geo)political scene through a strategy of redefining Europe in more conservative and traditionalist terms, as opposed to the liberal cosmopolitanism of EU’s project. Using the concepts of trans-ideology and biopolitics, the article claims that Russia’s strategy of re-entry includes narratives of othering today’s Orientalized Europe and salvaging it from liberal tolerance, political correctness and cultural fragmentation.
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| 8 |
ID:
156687
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The article addresses the sphere of performing arts as part of Russia’s security policy and, in particular, its propaganda dimensions. The authors approach cultural representations as appeals to universal norms rather than to national interests and in this respect focus on two specific cases of aestheticization of military force applied beyond the national borders of the Russian Federation — in Georgia in August 2008 and in Syria since September 2015. These cases are comparable with each other, since the external projections of Russia’s hard power were accompanied by similar cultural gestures — namely, public concerts of classical music performed by the world-famous Valery Gergiev’s Mariinsky Theater in two sites controlled by Russian troops, Tskhinvali and Palmyra. The article argues that the Russian government uses two strategies of aestheticizing its military missions — mimetic (implying the closest possible correspondence to reality) and aesthetic (based on imageries), though the distinction between the two is not always well fixed.
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