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ID:
006630
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| Publication |
International Monetary Fund, 1996.
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| Description |
xii,158p.
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| Standard Number |
1-55775-609-0
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 038385 | R 330.122/ITO 038385 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
074951
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The International Monetary Fund is often perceived as imposing harsh policies on countries facing financial crisis. A comparison of six countries affected by the pressures of the 1990s suggests more subtle effects. In Malaysia, India, and South Africa, policymakers kept the IMF at arms length to permit a more gradual and heterodox adjustment, including capital controls in India and Malaysia. By contrast, Argentina, Turkey, and Indonesia were bound tightly into the embrace of the IMF. However, this did not push policymakersto take tough decisions. Rather, IMF loans to Argentina and Turkey permitted policymakers to postpone difficult choices as both they and the IMF sought to protect previous policies and loans. In Indonesia, by contrast, borrowing from the IMF opened up a conduit for larger political pressures that brought down the Suharto regime.
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| 3 |
ID:
090444
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we demonstrate that changes in the partisan orientation of a country's executive branch influence the likelihood that the government of that country complies with international legal commitments aimed at integration of capital markets. We argue that relative shifts in executive partisan orientation, whether toward the left or toward the right, represent important shifts in "national preferences" that have heretofore been absent from statistical models of treaty compliance. Using a matching estimator combined with a genetic algorithm to maximize balance in our sample, we show that the causal impact of a state signing Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement is conditioned by right-to-left shifts in partisan orientation. The evidence indicates that such preference changes reduce the constraining effects of Article VIII but also indicates that Article VIII continues to exercise significant causal effects even in the face of relative shifts in executive partisan orientation.
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