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| 1 |
ID:
173979
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| Summary/Abstract |
The relations between China and Taiwan (cross-Strait relations) have been a thorny issue for all parties concerned. These relations are one of the flashpoints in the world, which may trigger a serious military conflict. They involve not only China and Taiwan but also the United States. The purpose of this paper is to account for the trajectory of this triangular relationship with the help of opinion surveys in Taiwan. It is shown that when the Kuomintang (KMT) gains the governing power in Taiwan, Taiwan is the median voter in the cross-Strait relations game at the international level while as a non-traditional KMT or the Democratic Progressive Party is in power, it is the US that turns out to be the median voter.
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| 2 |
ID:
077671
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most of the contemporary policy debate regarding economic interdependence and peace has focused on devising responses either in favor of or in opposition to the prevailing notion that trade is positively and unconditionally correlated with peace. The China and Taiwan case-noteworthy for the simultaneous presence of an ever-increasing economic interdependence and an adversarial political relationship-provides an interesting counter-example to the leading positions in the literature. What is missing in the literature is a model that studies states' decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a function not only of their own utility but also of their perceptions about how their opponent will respond. States' decisions to trade depend on the likelihood that their prospective trade partner will initiate a conflict, and decisions to initiate a conflict depend on perceptions of the likelihood that the target will concede. In this article, the authors develop a model that expands the domain of the trade-peace analysis by endogenizing and analyzing states' decisions to trade and initiate conflicts
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| 3 |
ID:
102761
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| 4 |
ID:
183138
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the evolution of the Communist Party of China’ policy towards Taiwan and identifies the major characteristics of different leaderships in the history of CPC. With the major goal to manipulate the domestic politics of Taiwan to prevent it from moving further towards independence, the CPC has, within the framework of national strategy, used the carrot (promised benefits or attraction based on positive values), the stick (military actions or threats, blockades and coercive policies in international politics, etc.), the net (relationships, networks and United Front work; developing local collaborators) and the needle (infiltration, sabotage and disinformation warfare) interchangeably with different emphases depending on the strategic environments it faced. The CPC’s policy towards Taiwan, thus demonstrates flexibility in the choice of tactics but remains constant in its strategic goals.
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| 5 |
ID:
081818
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| 6 |
ID:
062068
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