Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:4771Hits:25705363Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
PEKKANEN, ROBERT (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   073369


Electoral incentives in mixed-member systems: party, posts, and Zombie politicians in Japan / Pekkanen, Robert; Nyblade, Benjamin; Krauss, Ellis S   Journal Article
Pekkanen, Robert Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2006.
Summary/Abstract How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a "best loser" or "zombie" provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.
Key Words Political System  Japan  Electoral System 
        Export Export
2
ID:   062161


Japan's coalition of the willing on security politics / Pekkanen, Robert; Krauss, Elis S Summer 2005  Journal Article
Pekkanen, Robert Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication Summer 2005.
        Export Export