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| 1 |
ID:
065766
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| 2 |
ID:
128861
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Interventions into civil conflicts have been the focus of considerable research in recent years, but one of the limitations to many studies has been the emphasis on interventions once a conflict begins. While important, we know that states and other actors often take action prior to the onset of a civil war in hopes of diffusing - or exacerbating - a potentially volatile situation. To date, however, no one has been able to study these pre-conflict interventions because appropriate data did not exist. In this article we introduce a new dataset that fits this specific need. Our data identifies states that are at risk of civil war and codes instances of third-party military, economic, and diplomatic interventions. Based on forecasting models that derive risk scores for all states from 1957 to 2007, we are able to identify those states that are most at risk and provide detailed information about interventions that occur in those states. We include a brief empirical example that applies our new data on interventions to test for their effects on the likelihood of civil war or stability. Consistent with prior arguments regarding interventions during civil wars, we show that military interventions increase the risk of civil war onset, while economic and diplomatic interventions forestall that particular outcome. The limited example highlights just one of the potential uses for our new data. With it at hand, researchers will now have the ability to answer many of the vexing problems surrounding the processes that may or may not lead to civil war.
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| 3 |
ID:
106272
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Global terrorism and local rebellion are observed rather frequently; solutions appear to be rather sparse. A common strategy adopted by governments is to attempt to deter potential rebels from engaging in acts of violence, often by responding to attacks with violent reprisals directed at the populace from which the rebels are recruited. The logic supporting such a strategy follows from a theory of deterrence that we believe is underdeveloped. This theory focuses heavily on the credibility of the deterrent threat and on ensuring that the cost imposed by retaliation is high. This ignores the flip side of the deterrent threat-that is, the promise that if one does not misbehave (by engaging in acts of rebellion), one will not suffer retaliatory punishment. Policy designed to ensure that punishment is swift and severe (and perhaps disproportional) can undermine deterrence and actually encourage more potential rebels to become active. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that successful deterrence requires a strategy in which retaliation is proportionate and directed only at the guilty, as well as being certain. Moreover, potential rebels must believe that the innocent will have attractive opportunities outside of joining the insurgency as well as that the innocent will not be punished. We provide empirical illustrations of our thesis from participants in the Palestinian uprising, including several who have taken up arms against Israel.
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| 4 |
ID:
073764
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much of the empirical literature suggests that outside interventions tend to lengthen the expected duration of civil wars; conversely, the policy community often acts as if it holds the opposite expectation for the outcome of intervention. The authors argue that the divergence can be found in how models of intervention are specified in the literature. They propose a model with two novel contributions. First, they incorporate mediations as the key to resolving the strategic problems that the civil war parties face. Second, they account for the decaying effect of interventions over time. Their results suggest that diplomacy is critical for understanding the duration of civil conflicts. They find that mediation has a dramatic effect on the expected duration of a civil war and that when controlling for diplomatic efforts, economic interventions can also reduce the expected duration.
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| 5 |
ID:
085447
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent research in the civil war literature has focused on how and when external actors intervene. However, to date, systematic data have not existed on diplomatic efforts in conflict management. This article fills this gap and introduces a dataset on 438 diplomatic interventions in 68 conflicts stretching from 1945 to 1999. The authors briefly outline previous research on third-party interventions in civil wars, describe the dataset in some detail, including some initial patterns in the data, and describe how this dataset contributes to research into conflict processes.
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| 6 |
ID:
146926
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sanctions are designed to reduce the amount of resources available to the targeted actor and have the potential to be an effective tool for bringing disputing sides in a civil conflict to the bargaining table by altering incentives for continued fighting. Thus, there is reason to believe that sanctions can shorten the duration of civil conflicts. However, once sides in a conflict have moved to the use of violence to settle their dispute, it is hard for sanctions, in isolation, to impose enough cost to convince warring factions that settling a conflict has greater value than what could be expected from continued fighting. In this article, we argue that sanctions, in isolation, are unlikely to affect the duration of civil conflicts. However, when sanctions are combined with military interventions they can contribute to conflict management strategies resulting in shorter civil conflicts. We test our expectations empirically using data on civil conflicts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Database and data on economic sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Database. Our results suggest that the best hope for sanctions to shorten the duration of civil conflicts is if they are used as part of a comprehensive international response that includes institutional sanctions and military interventions.
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| 7 |
ID:
062589
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| 8 |
ID:
101345
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The last decade has generated a robust study on the role of external interventions into civil wars. This literature builds on a rather small but influential foundation that at minimum pointed in the direction for a more systematic exploration for the conditions that lead to effective interventions. After a decade or more of research, it seems appropriate to take stock of where we have gone, what our results tell us, and how we might further advance this important theoretical and policy issue. In this review, I summarize and evaluate the large N, broadly cross-national studies on the conditions that lead to external interventions, and the conditions that lead to their success. I follow this with a discussion of how best to advance our understanding and move the research process forward.
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| 9 |
ID:
117058
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With growing attention to peace-building in civil wars, scholars have increasingly focused on the role that international and regional organizations play in conflict resolution. Less attention has been paid to unilateral interventions undertaken by third-party states without the explicit consent of organizations and to the impact of unilateralism on how long civil wars last. In this article, we claim that unilateral interventions exert a cumulative impact on civil wars depending on interveners' interrelations. States with a cooperative rapport have an easier time in bringing civil wars to an end though they act unilaterally and follow their interests in the civil war environment, whereas states that compete for influence over war combatants prolong the fighting. Analysis results from post-1945 civil wars support our expectations and show that interveners supporting opposing sides of the war increase war duration. On the other hand, third-party states bandwagoning on the same side of a civil war are effective in stopping the fighting only when the intervening parties share similar preferences.
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| 10 |
ID:
065768
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| 11 |
ID:
048715
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| Publication |
Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1994.
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| Description |
xi,190p.
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| Standard Number |
0275946703
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039356 | 355.0213/REG 039356 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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