| Summary/Abstract |
This article is the second in a series of three that examines the Russian Armed Forces’ efforts to adjust its strategic command and control architecture in the post-Soviet period, taking into account wide-ranging shifts in force structure, missions, geography, resources, and leadership. From 2007 through late 2012, the Russian military was gripped with sweeping, painful, and controversial reforms implemented by Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov. Among many drastic changes, Serdyukov and particularly Makarov finally re-apportioned strategic C2 responsibilities between the General Staff, military districts, and service Main Commands. The latter were relegated largely to ‘train and equip’ roles, while the military districts became truly ‘joint’ commands, and the General Staff became the authority for all operational and strategic planning. The reforms were nascent by the time of abrupt military leadership changes in late 2012 and were not without flaws, but they were a critical breakthrough that simplified and rationalized roles and responsibilities at the highest levels of the Russian military.
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