Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
126318
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
It is just 10 days since Iran its interlocutors reached an interim deal in Geneva and its implementation has commenced with the announcement of a visit by the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the heavy water reactor project at Arak. The interim deal is about a temporary freeze, as a first step, in the progress of diverse aspect of the Iranian nuclear program but is of considerable significance even as a first step. This is because of the agreed links in the initial steps, with marginal softening of sanctions and the promise of no more of them. The deal also lays down in a comprehensive package the goal of negotiations and a process towards that goal which has been on the card of many months. An linking of the progress was felt when Iran and the IAEA accepted a work plan on November 11, 2013, to resolve outstanding issues. The subsequent negotiations in Geneva among the foreign Ministers of Iran and the P-5 plus Germany till the wee hours of November 24, 2013, were hard and intensive. Foreign Minister Zarif tweeted on the conclusion these negotiations that "there is white smoke".
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2 |
ID:
102034
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3 |
ID:
016989
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Publication |
1994.
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Description |
39-44
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4 |
ID:
137571
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5 |
ID:
149144
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6 |
ID:
159002
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7 |
ID:
172292
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Summary/Abstract |
The arms control approach of more than six decades to deal with the nuclear peril lies in shambles. Nuclear weapons remain in huge numbers, and the dire consequences of their use remain undiminished, with portents of a new era of deadlier weapons and a new spiral of arms race. Hence a detailed and deeper examination of all issues connected with nuclear weapons is called for. Key to this is centrality of nuclear disarmament and the overriding international commitment to abolish nuclear weapons and the premise that nuclear weapons are the instrument of mass annihilation and cannot be used as weapons of war. This basic premise was lost sight of in the political expediency and compulsions of the Cold War and the subsequent play of geopolitics. There is a need to return to this basic premise, which should not be subordinated to political management of a renewed nuclear arms race. In keeping with these basics the pathways to the ultimate goal of abolition have been delineated.
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8 |
ID:
137118
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Summary/Abstract |
The business-as-usual option forces member states and the secretariat to, willy-nilly, reduce the entire regional exercise to a talk shop of many levels, the summit being the topmost. At the same time, it is difficult to abandon this framework since no country would take the blame for doing it. While there are a number of other regional and sub-regional options actively considered and debated in think tanks and academia, the brute fact is that their praxis may not differ much from that of SAARC. This is because it is the same ministries and personnel in the capitals who deal with even the new formats, and mostly the same ideas and initiatives resurface. Take, for example, BIMSTEC. In the past several years, even BIMSTEC has fallen in a similar groove of a well trodden economic agenda, trade and infrastructure, investment, banking, etc., and similarly, a fledgling secretariat fumbling for staff and resources, and not much to show. The Indian Ocean Rim outfit has even larger membership, but similar handicaps.
It is, therefore, unrealistic to see alternatives to SAARC emerge successfully unless very high level interest is taken in a continuous process which begins with a doable and less ambitious agenda hooked to the quick delivery of results. In this sense, there is no doubt that bilateral cooperative processes move faster; but, should that put an end to regionalism?
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9 |
ID:
108373
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