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| 1 |
ID:
137241
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| Summary/Abstract |
Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? — This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution. Matching an offender to an offence is an exercise in minimising uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black-and-white problem; and strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically. Successful attribution requires a range of skills on all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent communication, and recognising limitations and challenges.
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| 2 |
ID:
047625
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| Publication |
Houndmills, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999.
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| Description |
xvii, 263p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0333693035
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043539 | 909/GAR 043539 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
151105
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| Summary/Abstract |
The post-World War II Australian military war crimes trials of Japanese from 1945–51 have been criticised for using a rule of evidence considerably relaxed from the ordinary requirements of a criminal trial, one that did not require witnesses to give evidence in person. Circumstantial evidence suggests that, in relation to a trial held in Darwin in March 1946 for war crimes committed in Timor, the secretive Special Operations Australia, otherwise known as the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD), took advantage of the rule. This article argues that the SRD did not allow their members to give evidence in person in an attempt to control and limit the dissemination of information about their operational and security failures in Timor from 1943–45. The SRD operation was adjudged by its own official historian as displaying ‘gross inefficiency and criminal negligence’. While the SRD’s failures were known to select personnel at the time, access restrictions to archival records in the post-war period, including the war crimes trials, meant that the extent of its failures and how it appeared to manage knowledge of them has not been widely known.
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| 4 |
ID:
073524
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper demonstrates that US-Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed. Bilateral US intelligence liaison relations with nominally neutral Sweden were of particular importance in the early years of the Cold War given its geographic location adjacent to the northwestern portion of the USSR. Moreover, the importance of Sigint received from the three principal Scandinavian countries covered by this paper (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden) proved to be quite important to the US intelligence community during the early years of the Cold War, when the US Sigint infrastructure was relatively weak and stretched thin by commitments in Asia and elsewhere. This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations, demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by.
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| 5 |
ID:
111612
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| 6 |
ID:
149192
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Surrey, Jane's Information Group, 2016.
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| Description |
920p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710631824
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058883 | 623.7305/EWI 058883 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
164305
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Surrey, IHS Markit and IHS Global Limited, 2019.
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| Description |
1265p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9780710632890
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059603 | 623.7305/EBB 059603 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 8 |
ID:
156599
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is based on documents from Japanese archives and works of Japanese and Polish historians and experts, most of which have been introduced to Russian circulation for the first time. It examines cooperation between Japan and Poland in military intelligence and cryptanalysis aimed against the U.S.S.R. in 1919-1945.
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| 9 |
ID:
124570
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2013.
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The article argues that signals intelligence was an organizational accomplishment in the sense of requiring a) the establishment of an independent organization and b) that this organization combine cryptanalysis with intelligence analysis, traffic analysis and interception. This was not pre-ordained but the outcome of specific conflicts and decisions at Bletchley Park during the first three years of the Second World War which transformed the Government Code and Cypher School from a cryptanalytical bureau to a fully-fledged signals intelligence agency. Detailed archival evidence is presented in support of this claim.
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| 10 |
ID:
172916
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The story of Operation Rubicon provides a ‘missing link’ in the history signals intelligence. It connects the period of the Second World War, dominated by Bletchley Park and Arlington Hall, with the Snowden era. This special section examines signals intelligence in the latter decades of the twentieth century, arguing that the processes of covert interference that were used help us to understand sources and methods in our present times. It examines new material that has emerged in Europe that expands our comprehension of the intelligence co-operation between the United States, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden, focusing on the control of technology corporations, especially Crypto AG. It argues that, as a result of Operation Rubicon, all states with high-grade computing, even the Soviet Union, were probably secret beneficiaries of this process and derived substantial flow of intelligence as a result, mostly from the global south. However, the task of exploring the material generated by Operation Rubicon has only just begun, since most of the product remains classified.
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| 11 |
ID:
073652
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent times, Pearl Harbor historiography has shifted towards the question of whether or not the Pearl Harbor attack could have been predicted through intercepted signals. The recent prodigious output of books and articles on this subject makes it necessary to reflect upon how the debate has developed. Some traditionalists (who believe that the Pearl Harbor attack surprised US and Allied authorities) continue to criticize revisionists (who believe that intercepted signals may have provided foreknowledge of the attack) using a blend of polemics and ad hominem criticism. That adversarial template began long ago with the first sharp criticisms of the work of revisionist historian Charles Beard. Similar criticisms of revisionists continue to the present day, but such criticisms are unfounded as relevant evidence concerning pre-Pearl Harbor signals intelligence, drawn from both archival and anecdotal sources, suggests that the revisionist thesis merits further scholarly attention.
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| 12 |
ID:
008600
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May 1995.
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| Description |
195-214
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