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| 1 |
ID:
098112
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| 2 |
ID:
064596
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| 3 |
ID:
110924
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Throughout 2011, a rhythmic chant echoed across the Arab lands: "The people want to topple the regime." It skipped borders with ease, carried in newspapers and magazines, on Twitter and Facebook, on the airwaves of al Jazeera and al Arabiya. Arab nationalism had been written off, but here, in full bloom, was what certainly looked like a pan-Arab awakening. Young people in search of political freedom and economic opportunity, weary of waking up to the same tedium day after day, rose up against their sclerotic masters.
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| 4 |
ID:
189178
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THE PARADIGM of international relations in the Persian Gulf in the 20th century was determined by the interests of major players: the US, Great Britain, the USSR, etc. At the same time, relations between the oil-producing monarchies of the region, for all their complexity and ambiguity, remained in the background. After the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the early 1980s, opportunities emerged for a serious integration process that could lead to the creation of a single economic space with a single currency and common governance structures. However, for a number of reasons - among which we will identify economic ones (similarity in export structure), dynastic ones (ambitions of the ruling families), and geopolitical ones (the desire of the US as the world hegemon to rule according to the "divide and rule" policy known since antiquity) - centripetal trends have given way to centrifugal ones. Moreover, the second decade of the 21st century as a whole was marked by the gradual departure of the main global player, the US, from the traditional doctrine of firm control to using "controlled chaos" tools to give regional players the opportunity to realize their own political ambitions, while the US mainly focused on protecting its key military, political, and economic interests.
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| 5 |
ID:
105086
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It was late at night on Tahrir Square. Egypt's embattled leader, Hosni Mubarak, had just given his bizarre speech vowing not to step down, and I followed an enraged crowd of several hundred protesters over to the state television building along the Nile, where they were gathering to denounce the official media for defaming the revolution. Up front, near the entrance, a fired-up speaker called out from a bullhorn: "Down with Anas al-Fiqi, the lying minister of information! Down with the corrupt regime!" To one side stood a different category of rebel entirely: scruffy guys and gals staring down at their cell phones. They were tweeting.
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| 6 |
ID:
127502
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Qatar has only recently emerged as a player in the foreign policy arena. The first sign of what has become a highly distinctive role was the establishment of Al Jazeera, which has changed for ever the way that news media are seen across the Arab world. Qatar then successfully mediated in several conflicts in the region, before playing an active role in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and taking a lead on Libya. Syria poses more of a problem. But Qatar, as a small, rich country in an unpredictable region, now enjoys a high level of global recognition as an independent state.
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| 7 |
ID:
116659
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| 8 |
ID:
099750
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