| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
091341
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Harverd University Press, 2003.
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| Description |
391p.
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| Standard Number |
0674017617
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054392 | 322.5/FEA 054392 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
064709
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| 3 |
ID:
108847
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| 4 |
ID:
055824
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| 5 |
ID:
015000
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| Publication |
1992-93.
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| Description |
160-187
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| 6 |
ID:
103839
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| 7 |
ID:
120315
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The field has traditionally studied civil-military relations in one of two domains: supreme command, where the great questions of war and peace were decided by the top leaders, or society, where the military institutions sought to establish themselves in relations to the broader civilian world. This special edition emphasizes a third domain: the modern battlefield of complex operations. In that setting the lines between civilian and military are even more blurred than in traditional settings (where they were already quite blurred), and concerns about effectiveness cannot be ignored for the sake of the traditional focus on control.
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| 8 |
ID:
001524
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| Publication |
London, Cornell Univ. Pr., 1992.
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| Description |
xx,261p.Hardbound
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| Standard Number |
0801426758
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041071 | 355.8251190973/FEA 041071 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
012488
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| Publication |
1996.
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| Description |
209-34
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| 10 |
ID:
008608
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| Publication |
1995.
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| Description |
754-772
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| 11 |
ID:
151012
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| Summary/Abstract |
Advocates of cultivating a resignation-in-protest ethic understate the costs and exaggerate the benefits. Military officers who believe that the policymaking process is heading in a bad direction already have ample recourse in the form of advising within the chain of command. If their advice is not heeded, it is exceedingly unlikely that the country would be better served by senior officers provoking a civil–military crisis to advertise their policy differences with civilian leaders.
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| 12 |
ID:
103654
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence-both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players-shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.
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| 13 |
ID:
068262
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| 14 |
ID:
151334
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States will soon reach a crossroads in its struggle against terrorism. The international coalition fighting the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has driven the group out of much of the territory it once held and, sooner or later, will militarily defeat it by destroying [1] its core in Iraq and Syria. But military victory over ISIS will not end the global war on terrorism that the United States has waged since 9/11. Some of ISIS’ provinces [2] may outlive its core.
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