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| 1 |
ID:
162639
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China’s influence in the world economy grows, scholars have become increasingly interested in distinct Chinese traditions of thought relating to the study of international political economy (IPE). While much has been written about historical Confucian ideas about tributary relations, IPE scholars have devoted little attention to another Chinese intellectual tradition that challenged those ideas in the 19th century: Chinese economic nationalism. In the wake of the two Opium Wars, early Chinese economic nationalist thinkers urged Chinese authorities to embrace a new priority of boosting the country’s wealth and power (fuqiang 富强) through an outward-oriented, state-led development strategy. Their ideas shared some similarities with Listian economic nationalism that became popular elsewhere in the world at this time, but they were developed without direct engagement with that Western-originated thought. The indigenous roots of 19th-century Chinese economic nationalism also gave it characteristics that distinguished it in interesting ways from the Western version of economic nationalism in that era. In addition to widening our understandings of Chinese traditions of IPE thought, this study of the distinct content and origins of early Chinese economic nationalism contributes to: recent efforts to overcome the Western-centric foundations of IPE thought, literature exploring the diversity of economic nationalist thought and its diffusion in the 19th century, and analyses of China’s post-1978 foreign economic policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
096245
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis encouraged speculation about the prospects for a 'Bretton Woods moment' in which the global financial system would be radically redesigned. Many of those hoping for this outcome have since become disillusioned with the limited nature of the international financial reform agenda. But the success and innovation of the Bretton Woods conference was made possible by unique political conditions that are not present today, notably concentrated power in the state system; a transnational expert consensus; and wartime conditions. Moreover, a close reading of history reveals that the Bretton Woods system did not emerge from a single moment but rather from a much more extended historical process. If a new international financial system is being born today, it will be a slower and more incremental development process that can be divided into four phases: a legitimacy crisis; an interregnum; a constitutive phase; and an implementation phase. Viewed from this perspective, post-crisis developments look more significant. The crisis of 2007-2008 has already intensified twin legitimacy crises relating to international financial policy and leadership. It has also generated an international reform initiative that has been unusual for its speed and internationally coordinated nature. Many of the details of this reform initiative remain unresolved and its content and breadth are hotly contested in various ways. We thus find ourselves in more of an interregnum than a constitutive phase. It remains unclear how quickly, if at all, the latter might emerge and in what form.
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| 3 |
ID:
085698
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| 4 |
ID:
102546
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The global financial crisis that erupted in summer 2007 has made the reform of international prudential financial regulation one of the top priorities of global public policy. Past scholarship has usefully explained the creation and strengthening of international financial standards with reference to three policy arenas: interstate, domestic, and transnational. Despite the accomplishments of this specialist literature, the recent crisis has revealed a number of limitations in the ways scholars have understood interstate power relations, the influence of domestic politics, and the significance of transnational actors within international financial regulatory politics. Taken together, developments in each of these three arenas suggest that researchers may also need to be prepared to shift from explaining the strengthening of official international standards to analyzing their weakening in the postcrisis world. The latter task will require scholars to devote more analytical attention to a wider set of international regulatory outcomes, including "informal regulatory convergence," "regulatory fragmentation," and especially "cooperative regulatory decentralization."
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| 5 |
ID:
089542
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the centre of the globalisation trend of the past few decades has been the creation of a global financial marketplace in which enormous sums of money came to be traded across the world unencumbered by capital controls.The future of this free wheeling, liberal international fenancial order is now in doubt.The most obvious challenge comes the global financial crisis that began in 2007, a crisis that is prompting governments everywhere to reconsider their commitment to deregulated finance.
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| 6 |
ID:
112801
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the past two decades, scholars of international political economy and the environment (IPEE) have become quite focused on the study of various international cooperative initiatives that seek to link economic and environmental issues in the wake of the 1987 Brundtland Report and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. This important work has enhanced our understanding of topics such as the economic dimensions of international environmental governance, the environmental activities of international economic institutions and regimes, and new kinds of private international regimes governing the environment-economy interface. This focus of IPEE scholarship has, however, steered attention away from larger structural trends in the international political economy, whose environmental implications are not addressed explicitly by significant international governance arrangements. Three such trends that are deserving of more attention from IPEE scholars include: the globalization of financial markets; the rise of newly powerful states such as China and India in the global economy; and the recent emergence of high and volatile commodity prices. Each of these structural trends-as well as their interrelationships-have important environmental consequences whose closer study enhances our understanding of the relationship between the international political economy and the environment. Their study also encourages scholars to widen their focus beyond treaties, institutions and regimes to examine broader global economic structures and processes, and the power relationships within them, in an interdisciplinary manner that can draw inspiration from the pioneers of the field of international political economy from the 1970s.
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| 7 |
ID:
157554
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nineteenth-century Latin America saw more extensive innovative thought about international political economy than generally recognized. Far from simply imitating British free-trade doctrine, Latin Americans from that era actively modified it to produce distinctive revolutionary, conservative, and developmental rationales for free trade. Opponents of free trade also generated three varieties of Latin American protectionist thought—developmental protectionism, artisan political economy, and autarchic protectionism—that foreshadowed some aspects of post-1945 Latin American structuralist and dependency thought. These various ideational innovations involved both of dominant British free-trade doctrine as well as adaptation of alternative ideas diffusing from elsewhere (a process that we call alternative localization). They reveal new dimensions of the intellectual agency of actors in peripheral regions in the context of the international diffusion of ideas. They also highlight underappreciated diversity within, and overlap between, the historical international political economy (IPE) schools of economic liberalism and economic nationalism. More generally, recognition of these Latin American contributions helps to widen the historical foundations of IPE in ways that are more inclusive of the voices, experiences, knowledge claims, and contributions of those beyond the core powers.
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| 8 |
ID:
165723
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| Summary/Abstract |
Financial nationalism has received little attention in the literature on Chinese nationalism. Nor has China been a focus of the emerging literature on comparative financial nationalism. This is surprising as financial matters were central to modern Chinese nationalism when it began to take shape in the 19th and the 20th centuries and financial nationalism remains an influential ideology in contemporary China, which has undoubtedly become a major actor in the international financial system today. Our exploration of Chinese financial nationalism seeks to begin to fill this gap in both sets of literature. This article examines three areas of concern shared by Chinese financial nationalists past and present – currency, foreign financial institutions in China, and international borrowing/lending. We find that, as China’s position in the international power hierarchy has evolved, the nature of financial nationalism has changed, from a largely inward and defensive orientation to an increasingly outward orientation. Our study also reveals diverse strands of thinking among Chinese financial nationalists, both now and in the earlier historical era, according to whether they hold a zero-sum or positive-sum conception of international financial relations. The case of China shows the richness of financial nationalism and highlights the importance of a nuanced understanding of this phenomenon.
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| 9 |
ID:
133476
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
What is the origin of the norm that international institutions should support the economic development of poorer countries? It is commonly argued that the norm of international development was pioneered by US president Harry S. Truman in a famous 1949 speech as a means of serving US economic goals in the early Cold War. But this norm in fact emerged much earlier from Sun Yat-sen's thinking in China in 1918 and after that from Latin American preferences in the inter-American context of the 1930s. The latter were particularly influential in encouraging US officials to design, in the early 1940s, the first international institution with a strong development mandate: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. During the negotiations leading up to the 1944 Bretton Woods agreements, Latin American policymakers supported and reinforced the US plans, as did representatives of China, India, and Eastern Europe. For officials from these countries and regions, international development promised support for their increasingly ambitious domestic development goals while minimizing the costs that had often been associated with private international investments in the past.
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| 10 |
ID:
064777
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| 11 |
ID:
157540
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| Summary/Abstract |
Building on this journal’s recent debates about the need for “global” international relations (IR), this article calls attention to the overlooked significance of two important Latin American thinkers from the interwar years: Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui. We argue that the study of their thought—and the debates between them—has much to contribute to current efforts to build a more global international political economy (IPE) whose classical intellectual foundations are less dominated by American and European scholarship. Through a detailed analysis of their thinking, we show how Haya and Mariátegui generated some highly innovative ideas about many IPE issues including the following: the negative impacts of imperialism on their region; the roles of class, race, culture, and indigenous peoples in anti-imperialist politics; the relationship of imperialism to the stages of capitalism; the regulation of foreign investment, economic regionalism, and the Eurocentric biases of IPE thought. We show how many of their ideas foreshadowed the better-known postwar Latin American contributions to IPE of structuralism and dependency theory in ways that have not been fully recognized. We also suggest that their critique of Eurocentrism served as an early precedent for the kind of global IPE that many are seeking to build in the current era. For these reasons, we argue that their work deserves much more recognition from contemporary IPE scholars than it has hitherto received and inclusion among the cannon of classical literature that forms the foundations of the field.
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