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| 1 |
ID:
064885
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| 2 |
ID:
171768
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| Summary/Abstract |
Leaders who wish to resolve their disputes through face-to-face negotiations often find themselves in various relational problems. An invitation to talk might be sincere, but it can also be a scheme to exploit one’s counterpart; a claim of value and threat to walk out unless certain demands are met might be serious, but it can also be a bluff; a claim that no further concessions is possible might be heartfelt, but it can also be an attempt to exaggerate one’s “Reservation Price”; and an urge to commit to an agreement might be genuine, but it can also be a ploy to trick a counterpart into a deal one does not intend to honor. What, then, are the interpersonal mechanisms that enable leaders to credibly communicate their intentions? In this article, I identify the diverse repertoire of emotions that leaders exchange when they interact up close, explain the different relational problems they overcome, and, as such, shed light on how their expressions enable leaders with otherwise conflicting interests to proceed through the different stages of a negotiation. Empirically, I present a number of episodes of face-to-face diplomacy from recent history. I also discuss a number of promising topics for future research.
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| 3 |
ID:
165318
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| Summary/Abstract |
When leaders negotiate face-to-face, why would an expression of anger make an interlocutor yield to one’s demand in some instances but cause him to become more intransigent in others? In this article, I consult recent findings in social and experimental psychology and provide an explanation for when anger is more likely to be considered a credible expression of resolve. Anger elicits concessions if a leader has projected an image for being composed most of the time. On the contrary, expressing anger makes an interlocutor more unyielding if a leader is known for becoming angry easily and frequently. I demonstrate such contrasting preconceptions of a leader’s temperament—a “stoic” versus a “hothead”—and their impact on the larger trajectory of international politics with two in-depth case studies on the face-to-face interactions between Khrushchev, Macmillan, and Eisenhower from the onset of the Berlin Crisis in November 1958 to the aborted four-power summit in Paris two years later.
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| 4 |
ID:
181030
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| Summary/Abstract |
Leaders often emerge from a face-to-face interaction with an implicit understanding on who is expected to stand firm and, conversely, to back down, on a disputed issue. How is that possible? In this article, I develop a theory of resolve performance. I argue that expressions of resolve are speech acts. To establish resolve, leaders must perform such acts competently, there and then, both verbally and behaviorally. A successful (or what speech act theory calls “felicitous”) performance also depends on the reaction of one’s counterpart. By virtue of the intersubjective belief they share about their respective performances—who has carried the day and who has “blinked”—a “focal point” often arises regarding how they are expected to proceed on the disputed issue. I elaborate on several types of speech acts leaders use to perform resolve (threats, implicatures, assertions, and challenges), and illustrate my theory with an in-depth case study on the two days of meetings between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. The leaders left the summit with the focal point that Kennedy was irresolute and Khrushchev was emboldened to make a move on Berlin. I discuss how such a focal point led to escalation of tensions between the two superpowers and what can be learned about the causal significance of face-to-face diplomacy in international politics.
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