Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
138806
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
Following the passage of the Counterintelligence (CI) Enhancement Act of 2002 1 U.S. government agencies that conduct CI have sought to increase collaboration with the public, other organizations and businesses, through partnerships and alliances. Despite these successes, CI personnel may underestimate what they have to offer to interested third parties who could become critical allies. Hence the question: How should CI outreach be conducted and shaped in order to create a strategic CI advantage? Correlative questions include: Should outreach operations and networks stay the same, evolve slowly, incrementally, or naturally over time, or be radically altered? How might current outreach programs be re-configured or deployed in order to meet evolving intelligence threats, operations, and challenges? While law enforcement has its informant networks, and traditional intelligence agencies often focus on managing their case load of assets, CI organizations may lack a strategically assembled network of support. Yet, organizations can evaluate their outreach operations and clients and then calibrate their network of relationships to enhance effectiveness and create a durable advantage over their adversaries.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
168051
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
The hostage release operations at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999 are studies in contrast in terms of the classic phases of hostage crises and responses of state actors. S Krishnan explores the crucial aspects of the two crises and looks for object lessons from the Israeli and Indian experiences, which evince deep differences in philosophy and capability between the two states.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
064910
|
|
|
Publication |
Apr-Jun 2005.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|