|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
032284
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press, 1978.
|
| Description |
xi, 273p.
|
| Standard Number |
0891580650
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 019142 | 322.5091717/HER 019142 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
070800
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2005.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The problem of unsanctioned relations has a major impact on all Army units.-Major V. V. Savel'ev
Of the many problems facing the Russian political and military leadership as it attempts to rebuild and reform the Russian armed forces, none is of greater concern than dedovshchina, or the harassment of junior recruits by more senior ones. It has undermined combat readiness, unit cohesion and led to an increase in suicides and desertions by recruits who cannot stand the kind of humiliation, beatings, rapes and even murders they face on a daily basis. In this regard, Vladimir Putin, Sergei Ivanov and the military high command are at a cross-roads. They have made some major, even fundamental structural changes in the way the Russian armed forces are organized and operate, but no change, not even the addition of desperately needed weapons, equipment, and financial resources or key personnel changes at the top will make the Russian Army into an effective military unless the Russian high command either gets rid of or minimizes the impact of dedovshchina. Such a step will not solve all of the Russian Army's problems, but it is a critical step on the way to making the Russian Army into a serious, cohesive, combat ready military.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
093944
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the manifold problems in Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov's radical reform agenda, there is clear evidence that such a program is being implemented regardless of opposition from those in uniform, especially on the General Staff. It is no exaggeration to suggest that depending on how fully it is implemented, this reform could have an impact on the lives of all Russian officers no matter where they serve now. The mass mobilization principle has been abandoned and the transition from a division-based system to the new brigade structure is complete. Meanwhile, despite careful planning by the General Staff, we do not believe the Russian military will emerge as a modern fighting force until 2020, if then. Budget cuts, production inefficiencies, poor maintenance and sloppy work will all inhibit the construction of a modern Russian army.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
064925
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|